P.B. 7-88-1 (Test)

Infantry

January-February 1988



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• INFANTRY is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building 1827, Fort Benning, GA. • Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position, and it does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry and infantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerning editorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 2005, Fort Benning, GA 31905-0605. • Telephone: (404) 544-4951; AUTOVON 784-4951. • Second-class postage paid at Columbus, GA, and additional mailing offices. • POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 2005, Fort Benning, GA 31905-0605. • USPS Publication No. 370630. ISSN: 0019-9532.

Commandant's NOTE

MAJOR GENERAL KENNETH C. LEUER Chief of Infantry

SNIPER TRAINING PROGRAM

Throughout history, snipers have proved to be an effective and economical combat multiplier. Their primary mission is to support combat operations by delivering precise long-range rifle fire on selected targets that, for various reasons, cannot be engaged successfully by riflemen.

Snipers are used to inflict casualties, slow or deny enemy movement, create confusion, and lower enemy morale. Specific targets for snipers include enemy leaders, command and control operators, antiarmor system gunners, forward observers for indirect fire, vehicle drivers, armored vehicle commanders, weapon crews, and enemy snipers.

A sniper's value in combat cannot be measured, however, solely by the number of casualties he inflicts upon the enemy. A sniper can also have a tremendous psychological effect on enemy forces by his mere presence, instilling fear in the minds of the enemy and influencing his decisions and actions. Too, a sniper's secondary mission is gathering intelligence because of his location on the battlefield, coupled with his fieldcraft training and assigned equipment.

Realizing that modern technology has not diminished the need for snipers, the Army recently renewed its interest in them and is revitalizing its sniper program. The Infantry School has taken the lead in these efforts, and we are committed to providing the best sniper organization, equipment, doctrine, and training possible.

Typically, snipers operate in two-man teams. Under the current force structure, the sniper element in each light infantry battalion is made up of six battalion scouts organized into three of these two-man teams. The teams are to be employed as either scouts or snipers as the factors of METT-T dictate. In the mechanized infantry battalions, the sniper element consists of two riflemen (one sniper team) in each line company headquarters.

Inherent in this structure is a recognition of the fundamental differences between light and heavy scout platoons in terms of tactical employment. In a light infantry battalion, the sniper's long range rifle complements the other weapons found in the scout platoon. In a mechanized infantry battalion, however, a long range rifle would not be used much in an environment of high-speed vehicles, antiarmor missiles, and automatic cannons that routinely fired beyond the rifle's range. In mechanized units, therefore, the sniper rifle is used to complement the other small arms found at company level and to provide a low-cost combat multiplier, particularly during MOUT, patrolling, and economy of force operations.

Each two-man team carries one sniper weapon system and a standard service rifle with a night sighting device (AN/PVS-4). The current sniper weapon, the M21, will soon be replaced by the M24, with fielding scheduled to begin in April 1988. The M24 is a bolt-action rifle (Remington Model 700) with telescopic and integral sights. This weapon features a 10-power fixed scope (Leupold M3 Ultra) and has a maximum effective range of 800 meters. Although the system does not include accessory sniper equipment, the M49 spotter scope and the AN/GVS-5 laser rangefinder will continue to be authorized for use with it.

The Army's formal sniper doctrine, until recently, consisted solely of TC 23-14, Sniper Training and Employment, which was published in 1969. For

some time, we at the Infantry School have been studying this issue in depth and have produced the coordinating draft for a new manual, FM 7-999, The Infantry Sniper; the draft has been distributed to the field for comment. After further study and revision, the completed manual should be available by late 1988.

Our efforts to revitalize the sniper program have also included the establishment of a three-week sniper course at the Infantry School, and we have taken action to establish an additional skill identifier (ASI) to be awarded to course graduates. Although the course is intended for soldiers in the ranks of private first class to sergeant, the School's training strategy is to fill the classes during the first year with mid-level noncommissioned officers (sergeants through sergeants first class/platoon sergeants). Our intent in this is to establish a train-the-trainer program so that our infantry units will have noncommissioned officers who are capable of sustaining sniper training.

The course is designed to train snipers to engage targets successfully at long ranges with precision rifle fire and to meet sniper fieldcraft standards. It emphasizes the sniper weapon system and long range shooting skills, and practice live fire and qualification exercises take up a significant amount of the allotted time. The four marksmanship instructors are Olympic class shooters from the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU). The other instructors, who are responsible for fieldcraft instruction and course administration, are high-quality noncommissioned officers from the 29th Infantry. The fieldcraft instruction emphasizes sniper camouflage, concealment, movement, tactics, and employment. The optimum class size of 18 allows for an instructor-to-student ratio of 1:2.

To attend, a soldier must meet the following prerequisites:

- Be a volunteer and have his commander's recommendation.
- Be in good physical condition with visual acuity of 20/200 or better uncorrected, correctable to 20/20.
- Hold MOS 11B, 11M, or 19D, with Skill Level 2 proficiency.
- Have no history of drug or alcohol abuse.
- Have no record of disciplinary action.

We have completed the first few classes, and the results are positive. We believe that the field is sending good students to the course and that the course is meeting its intended outcome. We are working to incorporate hands-on instruction and firing exercises with various Threat sniper systems and to increase our emphasis on limited visibility engagements.

In addition, we are updating mission training plans to incorporate sniper missions into them, and are developing situational training exercises (STXs) to assist units in sustaining their snipers' proficiency. A critical requirement that we are anxiously awaiting is the modification of MILES equipment for use with the sniper weapon system. That equipment will allow units to integrate snipers into their local training and also into their operations at both the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center. During these operations, our sniper doctrine can then be validated and the sniper payoff more easily recognized.

When trained to standard, a sniper has the potential of being a decisive factor on the modern battlefield. As Chief of Infantry, I am determined to make this capability a reality in every combat infantry battalion.

INFANTRY LETTERS

CORRECTIONS

Thank you for publishing my article "TOW Position: An Alternative" (September-October 1987, pages 36-38). In reading it, however, I discovered some errors:

On page 37, under the paragraph headed "It is split level," the word *machineguns* was an incorrect interpretation of the abbreviation *MGS*. The sentence should have read, "This makes it easier for the soldiers to manipulate both the TOW system during tracking and firing and the *missile guidance set* in testing the system, and it also offers the crewmen the protection of a deeper hole."

Also, on page 38 in the final paragraph of the article, the word *overwatch* should have been *overhead:* "At times, it may be both possible and desirable to build actual overhead cover for the system as shown in the manual."

Anyone who would like a copy of my original manuscript with the schematics of my proposed fighting position may write to me at Company A, NTC, ATTN: OPS GP, Fort Irwin, CA 92310.

MARTIN N. STANTON
CPT, Infantry

M3A1 LIGHT TANK

The tank pictured on page 7 of the September-October 1987 issue of INFANTRY is identified as an M3A1 Stewart light tank . . . the first American tank committed to use in World War II."

First, the correct spelling is "Stuart" (after the Confederate Cavalryman J.E.B. Stuart).

Yes, the M3 "light" tank was the first American tank to be used in World War II, but what you have pictured is not of the first type committed to action. The lend lease M3 (called the "Honey" by the British for its sweet disposition in comparison to their own tanks) and the M3 used in the defense of the Philippines had a riveted turret and a raised cupola. The pictured tank has a welded "horseshoe" turret.

Also, the early M3 light tanks mounted M1919A4 .30 caliber machineguns in the hollow bores (sponsons) over the treads in the belief their fires would detonate buried land mines. The tank in the photo has cast armor in place of the gun-mount openings. The fix on the M3 was to simply weld on a piece of plate steel in place of the gun aperture. This was due to the experiences of General Weaver's Provisional Tank Group during the defense of the Philippines that the fixed guns were of little use in combating mines.

The troops of the Tank Group (National Guardsmen of the 192d and 194th Tank Battalions) found through battle experience beginning in December 1941 that a more effective use of the scarce machineguns was to dismount them, and often the antiaircraft machinegun as well (which was continually stripped away by the jungle overgrowth), and to give them to the underequipped Philippine Army infantry units. The M3 then retained bow-mounted and coax .30 machineguns and this proved enough. Some tankers did keep their antiaircraft machineguns. Lieutenant Archibald Bianchi of the 31st Infantry manned such an exposed gun during the Battle of Trail Two and the Pockets, earning a posthumous Medal of Honor. (This information is from the recollection of my father, Technical Sergeant Zenon R. Bardowski, who fought on Bataan with Company B, 192d Tank Battalion.)

The M3 light tanks I have seen in photographs of the British 8th Army in the North African desert display riveted turrets as well, which leads me to believe that, while the tank pictured in your news section is of the type used in North Africa, it is a later model than the Stuarts initially employed.

STEPHEN Z. BARDOWSKI
128th Military History Detachment
Pennsylvania Army National Guard
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania

We welcome letters from our readers and print as many of them as we can. Sometimes it takes a while before we find room. But keep writing on topics of interest to our readers, and we'll do our best to publish your letters, sooner or later. All letters are subject to editing to fit space and other editorial requirements.

TANKS AND GENERALS

The tank shown on page 7 of the September-October 1987 issue of INFANTRY is an M3A1 *Stuart* (not *Stewart*) light tank, named originally by the British purchasers after Confederate General James Ewell Brown ("Jeb") Stuart.

Other American tanks in British service were the M3 medium tank dubbed "Grant" or "Lee" depending upon its armament, and the famous M4 medium "Sherman," a name also used by the U.S. Army.

Later tanks named by the U.S. Army after general officers were the M24 Chaffee; M26 Pershing; M41 Walker Bulldog; M47, M48, and M60 Patton; and the current M1 Abrams.

ERHARD F. KONERDING
Wesleyan University Library
Middletown, Connecticut

BATTLE DRESS

In his article "Battle Dress SOP" (INFANTRY, September-October 1987, pages 18-19), Captain Noyes B. Livingston III makes some excellent recommendations on the wear of the load bearing equipment (LBE). His reasoning and suggestions concerning how to best con-

figure the gear are very sound and evidently based on experience.

I take exception, however, to the basic principle of the article—that commanders should dictate an SOP to their soldiers. The LBE is an individual matter for the soldier to configure the way that best suits him. Commanders should have better things to do than dress their soldiers; it is bad for the individuals and the system when this occurs in a unit.

As Captain Livingston points out, the purpose of the LBE is to support the soldier's needs *in combat.* Toward that end, the soldier must learn what he needs and how best to organize his load. The commander is not going to be the one lying in the mud having to find a full magazine, or in the bottom of a foxhole trying to pull out a bandage. With proper, realistic training, the soldier can figure out what works best and he will organize himself accordingly.

Of course, training is the key. A truck driver will be happy with one ammunition pouch (for his candy and cigarettes) and a canteen, until he is ambushed a few times or is told he will have to revert to his secondary MOS (11B) for a couple of days. To an infantryman, this intimate familiarity with his combat life support system should be second nature after a few *good* exercises. An SOP, however, takes away that acquired knowledge and becomes just one more thing to do without any understanding of why.

In other words, such leading by the hand is a poor leadership technique that promotes ignorance and is just another way of destroying initiative. If he doesn't even have a chance to make his LBE work better, a soldier won't even try. This extends into all facets of leadership, and I would argue that a commander who oversupervises soldiers to this extent is creating a unit of drones, not aggressive, thinking soldiers.

The above statements argue from a leadership viewpoint that a soldier is the best one to figure out his own SOP. But this is also true from a practical viewpoint. The individual is by far the best qualified to judge what is comfortable, how weight should be distributed, and what in fact should be carried. Leaders at all levels have a legitimate interest in a minimum packing list. But it is impossible to make allowances for left-handed versus right-handed people (to determine which shooting shoulder should be left free of clutter), height, weight, or other physical characteristics.

The other age-old argument about whether the LBE should always be fastened or should be left open is also entirely personal. A fastened LBE in hot weather can contribute to heat injury; likewise, an open LBE may flap dangerously in a sudden fire-fight. Again, though, with good training the soldier will figure these things out for himself.

In summary, we don't need SOPs to tell soldiers how to wear the LBE. What we need is realistic training that stresses the soldier so he can figure things out for himself (and not just how to configure his equipment). Micro-managing instructions may make a unit look uniform and pretty, but that is not a legitimate goal for a combat ready organization. In fact, the need for such supervision is probably more a sign of a weak unit than a strong one.

GREGORY T. BANNER
CPT, Special Forces
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT VIDEOTAPES

The Academy of Health Sciences has produced a series of eight videotapes for heavy and light forces to be used to provide an overview of medical support doctrine forward of the brigade support area.

These videotapes will help unit members understand medical support doctrine for company through brigade level operations. The videotapes will be available to units through installation training support centers by early 1988.

The videotape titles and release numbers to use when ordering are as follows:

- An Introduction to Health Service Support AirLand Battle (TVT 8-141).
- Soldier Health Maintenance (TVT 8-142)
- Far Forward Care (TVT 8-143).
- Unit Level Health Service Support (Heavy Division) (TVT 8-144).
- Extricate Wounded Crew from the M-1 Tank (TVT 8-145).
- Extricate Wounded Crew from the M-3 (TVT 8-146).
- The Medical Company of the Forward Support Battalion (TVT 8-147).
- Health Service Support of Tactical Operations (Heavy Division) (TVT 8-148).

For further information, call Captain Hacker, ARTEP Branch, Unit Training Division, AUTOVON 471-2672/6291.

JAMES P. LAIBLE
COL, Medical Services
Director of Training and Doctrine
Academy of Health Sciences
Fort Sam Houston, Texas

THE MILITIA

I enjoyed Captain Robin M. Cathcart's article "Forgotten Heritage" (INFANTRY, July-August 1987, pages 18-19). It is good to remind all of us of the One Army Concept and to point out that there are many Reserve and National Guard units with a long and proud history.

But he made a common error that is of Constitutional significance. The National Guard is not THE militia of the United States — it is only one part of the militia.

Section 311, Chapter 13, Title 10, United States Code quite clearly states what the militia is:

The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are commissioned officers of the National Guard.

Interestingly enough, it is possible to be in the Guard and not be in the militia, as only those women with commissions are in the militia. Therefore, all enlisted and warrant officer women are not in the militia.

Please don't think that this is just historical trivia. It pertains to our military and national heritage.

MICHAEL M. SMITH
Fayetteville, North Carolina

INFANTRY NEWS

THE U.S. TOTAL ARMY Personnel Agency, or TAPA, was activated 1 October 1987 in Alexandria, Virginia. TAPA consolidates the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), the Army's Civilian Personnel Center, the Physical Disability Agency, and the Drug and Alcohol Operations Activity.

This reorganization of personnel functions is expected to improve the Army's ability to move from peace to war while also making the most of its peacetime capabilities.

Active Army and Reserve Component soldiers and Department of the Army civilians worldwide will not notice changes in the operations performed by the former Military and Civilian Personnel Centers. Those functions have simply been streamlined under TAPA.

A THROUGH-THE-MASK feeding system is being tested by the Army's Natick Research, Development, and Engineering Center for use by soldiers wearing special protective clothing.

The project, under way for several years now, is scheduled to end in 1990, at which time tube foods may become available to soldiers as a special ration item.

Various foods have been tested so far, including beef and gravy, sloppy joes, turkey, yams, chicken a la king, beef stew, butternut squash, corn, apple pie, applesauce, puddings, fruits, flavored electrolyte beverages, and coffee with cream and sugar. Also in the works for future experiments are grits with sausage and French toast.

All the foods tested were prepared at the Natick Center and thermally processed, through either pasteurizing or retorting (sterilizing at high temperature under pressure), depending on the acidity of the food. The foods were then sent to a microbiology laboratory to confirm their sterility.

The tubes are aluminum, six and three-fourths inches long and one and one-half inches in diameter with a five-ounce capacity. The foods are placed in a 28-volt "tube warmer" that plugs into a transport vehicle's electrical system. Each warmer heats six tubes to 135 degrees Fahrenheit in 20 to 30 minutes.

A plastic device screwed onto the threads at the end of the tube is inserted through a valve on the face mask, and the soldier squeezes the contents through the mask to eat it.

In a test last summer, soldiers evaluated the foods and concluded that they could probably eat food in tubes for two and one-half days before becoming bored with them.

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY John O. Marsh, Jr., was awarded the 1987 Distinguished Doughboy Award at the annual Infantry Ball in Washington on 14 November 1987.

The award—a brass-plated, World War I doughboy helmet mounted on a walnut base decorated with crossed rifles—is presented each year to an individual who has rendered great personal service to the morale and welfare of the infantryman.

In his acceptance speech, Secretary Marsh highlighted the U.S. infantryman's role throughout the nation's history and said the infantry soldier is and will continue to be "a key player in the strategy and doctrine of the Army . . ., because the Infantry is now and it shall continue to be the queen of battles."

Each year a committee chaired by the Chief, Infantry Branch, Total Army Personnel Agency, nominates individuals for the award, and the Chief of Infantry at the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School makes the final selection.

Previous recipients of the award, established in 1980, include Bob Hope, Bill Mauldin, and Major General Aubrey S. Newman, U.S.A., Retired.

THE NATIONAL INFANTRY Museum has provided the following items:

The Seventh Annual National Infantry Museum Five-Mile Run saw record participation and raised record funds for the Museum. There were about 5,300 runners and more than $17,500 was raised to benefit the Museum.

Plaster cast busts of Generals John J. Pershing and George S. Patton, Jr., have been removed from display and placed in the hands of a foundry to be used for molds for bronze castings. Since these are very good likenesses and popular with viewers, and since the plaster was deteriorating, it was felt that they deserved to be preserved in a more durable material.

The 1987 index to INFANTRY has been prepared separately and is available to anyone who requests a copy. Please address your requests to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 2005, Fort Benning, GA 31905-0605.

The culmination of the National Infantry Museum's events to honor the 200th anniversary of the signing of the Constitution was a ceremony at which numerous red, white, and blue balloons were released in front of the building by school children, and a bell was rung for 200 seconds to coincide with other bell ringings around the country. The bell used was one cast for the U.S. Army in 1860 at Troy, New York.

American Heritage Magazine plans to feature a National Infantry Museum holding, a regimental flag of the Second Regiment of Colored Troops in the Civil War, on the back cover of an upcoming issue. That issue will include a collection of stories that deal with black soldiers and the U.S. Army.

The 11th Airborne Division monument was recently installed across the street from the front of the Museum. A gift of the 11th Airborne Division Association, the monument is a large statue (nearly seven feet tall) of a young 11th Airborne Division trooper standing on a granite base with his rifle raised over his head. The figure, cast in bronze, is the work of the noted sculptor Franco Vianello.

Some recent Museum acquisitions are a Soviet Makarov pistol; herringbone twill trousers and jacket; paratrooper boots worn by the donor when he jumped into Normandy on 6 June 1944; a U.S. model 1842 musket; an Australian sniper suit donated by the Chief of the Infantry Center, Singleton, Australia; a 9mm Beretta pistol; nineteenth century Massachusetts Militia buttons; a swagger stick made of wood carved by a North Vietnamese POW; a Cooper revolver; a variety of reference books; and letters, photographs, and other papers relating to General Asa L. Singleton, a past Fort Benning commanding general.

The National Infantry Museum Society, formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support, is open to anyone who is interested in joining. The cost is $2.00 for a one-year membership or $10.00 for a lifetime membership.

Additional information about the Museum and the Society is available from the Director, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5273; AUTOVON 835-2958 or commercial (404) 545-2958.

NEW PROTECTIVE ensembles for use by explosive ordnance detachments (EODs) have been ordered by the Army. The new protective system, designed by the U.S. Army Natick Research, Development, and Engineering Center, will give EOD soldiers an edge in safely defusing the small explosive devices favored by terrorists.

Until now, the Army has not had a complete armor system to protect EOD technicians in performing their delicate tasks and to prevent or at least minimize injury.

Consequently, Natick was tasked with developing protective equipment that would be lightweight and flexible enough without creating unnecessary encumbrances.

The suit is made of Kevlar, a tough synthetic fiber woven into a durable, strong fabric that, pound for pound, is twice as strong as steel. The outer shell is made of fire retardant Nomex, which is light but durable.

For head protection, the PASGT (Personnel Armor System, Ground Troop) helmet is used and reinforced with a bonnet that contains 12 extra layers of Kevlar. A great deal of consideration was given to head protection, not only from a ballistic point of view but also as to weight and heat stress. The chest plate and face shield are designed as one piece. The face shield is made of a polycarbonate and acrylic material, mounted on a form-fitted fiberglass chest plate that is inserted in the chest pocket of the protective jacket. Ballistic eye wear is also worn.

A MICROWAVE FIELD FEEDING program is being developed that will allow small groups of soldiers in isolated sites to prepare "shelf stable" foods without leaving their sites. Shelf stable foods are pre-cooked and preserved and do not need refrigeration. Final preparation consists of warming the foods in a microwave oven that can be plugged directly into a NATO plug on a tactical vehicle or into a standard 110-volt outlet on a communication shelter.

The tray pack feeding system now being used is designed in modules to feed up to 36 people and, once opened, cannot be transported to smaller sites and still maintain sanitation. A common alternative therefore has been for the soldiers in isolated sites to eat MRE rations three meals a day.

The food in the microwave field feeding program consists of individual packets of meat, casseroles, vegetables, and desserts, supplemented with beverages and bread. A typical breakfast is juice, a bacon omelette, corned beef hash, and fruit. Lunch or dinner might be a tuna-noodle casserole, carrots, and pudding.

Still under development and not yet tested with the microwave oven is the "thermostabilized meal tray," which is also shelf stable and looks like a TV dinner. MREs cannot be heated in a microwave oven unless the food is removed from the foil packages and placed on a paper plate.

Resupply is simplified since several days worth of meals can be left at a site in advance, and troops can take their oven and food with them when they do move to a new location. Maintenance is not a problem, since small commercial ovens are relatively inexpensive and can often be replaced instead of repaired.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Logistical Planning

MAJOR GREGORY C. VOGEL

Like the tactician in planning for tactical operations, the logistician must have a set of guidelines or principles to follow (or at least to consider) when planning support for these operations. And like the Principles of War, there are nine Principles of Logistics (listed in FM 701-58, Planning Logistic Support for Military Operations). The amount of risk the logistician and the commander decide to take and the type of mission to be accomplished will determine the order of priority assigned to these principles. They are the following:

Logistics Intelligence. Effective logistical planning requires that accurate and timely logistics information be obtained, analyzed, and made available to commanders.

Objective. Logistical support must be directed toward a clear and attainable goal—the support of the designated mission.

Generative Logistics. The logistician must apply initiative, knowledge, and innovative methods in order to improve the logistical system.

Interdependence. All logistical functions are related to some degree; no one function can operate effectively if the others have not also been considered.

Simplicity. Systems of support should be simple and direct. Complex plans will only increase the probability that something will go wrong.

Timeliness. Support must be provided in the right amount and at the proper time and place to accomplish the mission.

Forward Impetus. Logistical support must be pushed as far forward as possible to the combat units. Little supply point distribution should be used.

Cost Effectiveness. The efficient management of logistical resources is essential as new programs and the funds to support them become more and more scarce.

Security. To preserve resources and thus ensure sustained combat capabilities, logisticians must maintain the security of all logistical areas and supplies.

In addition to these principles, a logistician must keep in mind those factors that can influence combat service support (CSS) requirements for each different type of military operation. These logistical factors are crucial in providing a basis from which all CSS will occur and for developing a rational, timely support plan.

The following are the factors that can influence CSS requirements:

- The number and type of troops to be supported.
- The quantity, type, and distribution of equipment.
- The level of support to be provided (organizational, direct support).
- When the force will be deployed.
- The climate and terrain characteristics.
- Whether a strategic or tactical deployment will be used.
- The status and availability of resources (local, allied, carried on deployment).
- The size of the area of operations.
- The attitudes, availability, and capabilities of local civilians and prisoners of war.
- The availability, capabilities, and limitations of CSS units (division, corps).
- The enemy's capabilities.
- The medical evacuation policy.
- The self-sustaining capability of friendly forces.
- The levels of supply that will be carried by individuals and units (Class I, III, V, IX).
- The commander's priorities for support.
- The consumption factors for the type of operations being planned and the climatic conditions (FM 101-10-1).
- The weapon systems whose operability is critical to the success of the mission.
- The threat to CSS operations both forward and rear area.
- Any major tactical contingencies that may arise (future operations).
- The location of supporting and supported units.
- The security of the force.

In planning a location for the brigade support area (BSA), a logistician must consider certain other factors as they pertain to the type of unit being supported. With light infantry, for example, the general rule of thumb for the distance between the FLOT (forward line of own

troops) and the BSA is about 10 to 15 kilometers. The subordinate unit field trains normally set up within the BSA, while their combat trains generally set up three to five kilometers from the FLOT.

Consideration of the following factors will help a logistician as he looks for appropriate areas in which to set up his BSA, or even a combat trains site:

- Defensible terrain.
- Sufficient space to permit dispersion.
- Firm ground to support the weight of vehicles.
- A water source (if possible).
- A suitable helicopter landing site.
- A good road network (primary and alternate routes in and out).
- Adequate cover, concealment, and drainage.

A logistician must also think about the different needs a unit will have depending upon the type of tactical operation in which it is going to be involved. (Some of these needs are common to all types of operations, while others apply to one type only.) Each tactical mission must be looked at separately, of course, on the

LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

- Plan for forward positioning of essential CSS supplies and services (ammunition, fuel, oils, lubricants, food, maintenance).
- Plan for increased POL consumption.
- Move/resupply at night whenever possible.
- Plan for use of preplanned/preconfigured push packages of essential items.
- Plan for increased vehicle maintenance, especially over rough terrain.
- Plan for maximum use of forward mobile maintenance and support teams.
- Plan for maximum use of throughput distribution to company and platoon level.
- Plan for increased MRE consumption.
- Plan for use of airlift/airdrop for resupply.
- Plan for use of captured enemy supplies and equipment.
- Look for availability of natural water sources.
- Plan for intensified graves registration operations.
- Plan for adequate CSS primary and alternate communications.
- Carefully select primary and alternate supply routes.
- Upload as much material as possible.
- Don't give away tactical plan with CSS preparations.

STATIC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

- Stockpile supplies and equipment forward at successive defensive positions.
- Position CSS units out of the flow of the battle.
- Emphasize camouflage, cover, and concealment.
- Plan for self-defense against rear area control operations (RACO) threat.
- Be prepared to switch to offensive operations.
- Plan for high expenditures of ammunition.
- Plan for decreased use of fuel.
- Plan for decreased vehicle maintenance.
- Plan for increased Class IV material requirements.
- Consider repositioning CSS units farther to the rear to allow for maneuver of reserve.
- Plan for more tray packs during the preparation phase and then MREs during the execution phase.
- For covering force operations, plan for airdrop of supplies and for prepositioning of stocks and use of caches forward as well as on fall-back positions.
- Plan to resupply at night and during other periods of limited visibility.

DYNAMIC DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

- Plan for increased POL consumption.
- Plan for increased vehicle maintenance.
- Minimize evacuation requirements; send maintenance teams forward to make repairs.
- Plan for preplanned/preconfigured push packages for resupply (Class I, III, V, IX, water).
- Plan for increased MRE consumption.
- Plan for increased airlift/airdrop for resupply.
- Carefully select primary and alternate resupply routes (different from tactical routes, if possible).
- Upload as much material as possible.
- Plan to resupply at night and during other periods of limited visibility whenever possible.

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

- Plan to echelon CSS elements in depth and leapfrog them toward the rear during execution.
- Limit flow of supplies forward to combat-essential items.
- Evacuate all nonessential supplies and equipment early.
- Establish cache points along routes of withdrawal.
- Destroy all supplies and equipment (except for medical) that cannot be evacuated.
- Keep supply and evacuation routes open.
- Withdraw forward medical units as early as possible.
- Plan for alternate means of evacuating casualties.
- Use air evacuation as much as possible.
- Emphasize evacuation over treatment.
- Emphasize evacuation of equipment over forward repair.
- Plan to resupply and evacuate equipment at night and during other periods of limited visibility.
- Plan for and be alert to RACO threat.
- Don't give away the tactical plan with CSS preparations.

NBC OPERATIONS

- Plan for alternate methods of supply since lines of communication may be interrupted (container delivery, heavy drop, Army aviation, and the like).
- Plan for increased use of water and other decontaminants.
- Plan for medical augmentation and evacuation of a large number of patients.
- Plan for protection of equipment and supplies from contamination.
- Plan for rapid resupply of chemical protective equipment and supplies.
- Plan to rotate CSS personnel frequently during periods of moderate to heavy work rates while in NBC gear.
- Plan for processing NBC information rapidly to facilitate avoidance of contaminated areas.
- Ensure that CSS soldiers are well trained in decontamination and NBC survey procedures.

basis of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available), but the lists shown in the accompanying box can help a logistician prepare for the support of various types of missions. (These lists can be found in several logistical field manuals, but they have been brought together and modified for this article on the basis of numerous after action reports from field training, command post, and emergency deployment readiness exercises.)

Successful logistical operations require a great deal of planning and timely execution as well. The lists presented here are designed to stimulate the thought processes of the logistician as he tries to balance the tasks and resources he has been given. These lists should be used, modified, and updated as required.

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Aiming Circle Accuracy

CAPTAIN J. KEVIN MUILMAN

Accuracy is as critical for a mortar platoon as for any other combat unit, and it begins with the precise declination of the M-2 aiming circle.

In the U.S. Army Infantry School's Infantry Mortar Platoon Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, students are taught that the aiming circle is declinated using at least two distinct points (each at least 1,000 meters from the aiming circle) whose direction from the point the aiming circle is set on has been surveyed to an accuracy of plus or minus two mils.

In West Germany and away from the major U.S. training areas, however, declination points surveyed in mils are nonexistent, and mortar platoons are usually unable to declinate their aiming circles accurately. There are many surveyed points across the countryside, of course, but these points, published by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany in pamphlets called *Trigliste,* are all in longitude and latitude. The solution is a simple one, though—to declinate aiming circles accurately in Europe, longitude and latitude must be converted into the mil relationships that U.S. soldiers are trained to use.

When a direct support field artillery battalion is nearby, its survey data will give a mortar platoon leader all the declination information he will need. But when direct support battalions are decisively engaged or are not present, mortar platoons need to know how to make these conversions.

To convert longitude and latitude to mil relationships, therefore, a mortar platoon needs the following equipment: a 1:50,000 scale map of the area in which it is operating, a *Trigliste* for the area, a calculator, and a trigonometric functions table (if the calculator does not have trig functions on it).

First, through a map reconnaissance of the area, the mortar platoon leader chooses a surveyed point on which to set the aiming circle. (On most 1:50,000 scale maps of Europe, these surveyed points are represented by a small triangle with a point in the center marking the exact location of the surveyed point.) This point must have at least two other surveyed points within eyesight and be 1,000 meters or more from the aiming circle. These second two points are the distant aiming points.

By using the *Trigliste,* he determines the longitude and latitude of the aiming circle point and the two distant aiming points. He labels these points on the map with a point number and a map sheet number and references them in the *Trigliste* by these numbers. (For example, a point labeled "134/7522" is point number 134 on map sheet 7522.)

He then calculates the mil direction of each of the distant aiming points from the aiming circle separately. Each distant aiming point falls into one of four quadrants formed by the north-south and east-west grid lines that pass through the aiming circle point (Figure 1).

He draws a right triangle, making the



Figure 1



Figure 2

aiming circle point one corner, the distant aiming point the vertex, and the base of the triangle *a cardinal direction grid line.* Thus, the base of the triangle for a distant aiming point in quadrant I is the east grid line; in quadrant II, it is the south grid line; in quadrant III, the west grid line; and in quadrant IV, the north grid line (Figure 2).

He then labels the side of the triangle opposite the aiming circle "A," labels the base of the triangle "B," and labels the angle at the aiming circle "C" (Figure 3).

After this has been done, the platoon leader determines the lengths of the sides A and B of the triangle. He does this by subtracting the smaller of the longitudes from the larger of the longitudes, and the same for the latitudes, keeping in mind that there are 60 seconds to one minute and 60 minutes to one degree. The results are the lengths of the sides A and B in minutes and seconds. He converts any



Figure 3

minutes to seconds by multiplying the minutes by 60 to express the result entirely in seconds.

Since the tangent (TAN) of angle C is equal to the length of side A divided by the length of side B (A/B), he locates the result in the TAN column of a standard trigonometry table and finds the corresponding degree relationship. If the result of A/B is greater that 1 (1.3, for example), then the 1 is automatically equal to 45 degrees in the degree column, and 0.3 is referenced in the tangent column of the trig tables. The result for 0.3 is 16.7 degrees. Thus, if A/B equals 1.3, TAN 1 (45 degrees) plus TAN 0.3 (16.7 degrees) equals 61.7 degrees. Angle C then equals 61.7 degrees.

He must now convert the angle from degrees to mils, and does this by multiplying the number of mils per degree (17.7778) by the number of degrees in the angle (61.7), which equals 1096.890



Figure 4

mils. He repeats this process for each distant aiming point.

The following are the mil relationships between the distant aiming points and the cardinal directions used to construct the right triangles. Simple addition and subtraction will give the mil angles between the distant aiming points and grid north:

- If the distant aiming point is in quadrant I, subtract the mil angle from 1600.
- If the distant aiming point is in quadrant II, subtract the mil angle from 3200.
- If the distant aiming point is in quadrant III, subtract the mil angle from 4800.
- If the distant aiming point is in quadrant IV, subtract the mil angle from 6400.

The results are the azimuths of the distant aiming points. Once the declination constant from the map is applied, the aiming circle can be declinated as usual.



Figure 5

POINT	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE
Aiming Circle	9° 27′ 02″	48° 28′ 32″
Distant Aiming Point 1	9° 27′ 36″	48° 28′ 53″
Distant Aiming Point 2	9° 26′ 30″	48° 28′ 20″

Table 1

Longitude of distant aiming point 1	48° 28′ 53″
Longitude of aiming circle	-48° 28′ 32″
Difference in longitude	21″
Latitude of distant aiming point 1	9° 27′ 36″
Latitude of aiming circle	-9° 27′ 02″
Difference in latitude	34″

Table 2

For example, the platoon leader does a map reconnaissance and finds three points that he will use to declinate his aiming circles (Figure 4). Using the *Trigliste* for the area, he determines the longitude and latitude for the points (see Table 1).

He superimposes these points on a grid with the aiming circle at the center, and constructs right triangles with the aiming circle being the angle opposite the right angle. He labels the sides and the aiming circle angle as outlined in Figure 5.

Using distant aiming point 1, the platoon leader then determines the differences in longitude and latitude between this point and the aiming circle by subtracting the smaller longitude from the larger and then repeats the step for the latitudes (Table 2).

The difference in longitude is the length of side A in seconds and the difference in latitude the length of side B. Side A (21″) divided by side B (34″) gives the tangent of angle C—0.617647.

The platoon leader then uses a standard trigonometric table or a calculator with trig functions to determine the relationship of TAN 0.617647, which is 31.7 degrees. When this figure is multiplied by 17.7778 (mils per degree), the result will be angle C in mils—563.556. (He uses the same procedure to find angle C for distant aiming point 2.)

These are the mil relationships between the distant aiming points and the cardinal directions used in constructing the right triangles. Once the platoon leader knows both angles, he figures the mil relationships between the distant aiming points and grid north on the basis of the quadrant the aiming point falls into.

Using the rules given previously, the platoon leader subtracts the mil angle for distant aiming point 1 from 1600 (since the distant aiming point is in quadrant I): 1600 minus 563.556 equals 1036.444 mils. He subtracts the mil angle for distant aiming point 2 from 4800 since it is in quadrant III.

His final task is to apply the declination constant from the map to convert the mil relationships between the distant aiming points and grid north to the relationships between these points and magnetic north. The results are the mil angles that he can use in declinating his aiming circles.

Mortar platoons do not have to use aiming circles for all fire missions, of course. In combat there will be times when the need to declinate the aiming circle is outweighed by the need to lay in the guns and fire a mission as rapidly as possible using the aiming circles "as they are." But a declinated aiming circle is analogous to a zeroed rifle and will increase the effectiveness of the mortars, the battalion commander's only indirect fire support.

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"Please Use Me!"

The Cry of A Mortar Platoon Leader

LIEUTENANT RENE G. BURGESS

Let's say you're a brand new light infantry mortar platoon leader, intent upon making your platoon an integral part of the battalion combat team. Your men are trained and competent, your fire direction center (FDC) is fast and accurate, and you have more vehicles and radios than you ever expect to need. Given a light infantry battalion's limited fire power, you expect to hear your radios crackling with calls for fire, but you go through a battalion-sized infiltration or attack

with only one or two fire missions. When you question your soldiers, you learn that they have been called only two or three times for fire missions during the past several field problems.

Or perhaps you're a light infantry battalion commander or a battalion S-3. Your experience and professional reading have reinforced your belief that your most responsive fire support in combat will be the battalion heavy mortar platoon. You are therefore quite frustrated to learn that the mortars are seldom used in training exercises.

The 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division (Light) completed a 14-day rotation through the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, a few months ago. The aggressive, highly trained opposing forces (OPFOR) regiment and the unforgiving mountainous desert terrain were formidable opponents, and the technology available at the NTC provided an accurate picture of how well the unit fared in each battle.

As the battalion's mortar platoon leader, I experienced the frustrations of being neglected for the first half of our rotation. During the second half, however, the 81mm mortar platoon answered about 60 fire calls and expended more than 1,000 simulated rounds. This drastic increase in utilization was a result of an aggressive "Let's make it work" attitude on the part of the battalion combat team, an attitude facilitated by the NTC's after action reviews at the completion of each major mission.

The NTC has become the Army's most advanced training evaluation system through its network of computer-monitored position locators (one per platoon or section), observer-controllers (OCs) to assess casualties and take notes, fire markers for mortar and artillery fires, and computer-monitored MILES equipment on every soldier or vehicle. Each battle is run nonstop under the NTC rules of engagement, which allow for chemical and indirect fire casualties (through the main computer and the OCs), direct fire casualties (through the use of MILES and the OCs), and casualty evacuation play (with casualty cards handed out by the OCs).

At the conclusion of each battle, the key players are brought into an after action review trailer where the battle can be replayed on a large-screen computer. The entire planning process is carefully examined and explained by everyone involved. Following this, the battle is replayed on the screen, with position locators showing the exact locations of units, as unit commanders explain their actions and thought processes. Each after action review ends with the statistics—the number of friendly and enemy forces killed or wounded, the method by which they were killed or wounded, the number of rounds fired, and the effectiveness of each major weapon system.

The infantry mortar platoon needs to be an integral part of the battalion combat team.

This process of accurately re-creating and examining each battle led our battalion, as a unit, to learn to improve daily. It also allowed the battalion commander to identify any weak points in our fire support network and to take the steps necessary to ensure that the system would work the next day. Through this daily refining of mortar platoon SOPs, the staff planning process, and the fire support control measures, we were able to move forward rapidly to deliver effective fire support and to change my own battle cry from "Please use me" to "I need more ammunition!" The major factors that contributed to this turnabout were an increased emphasis on communication, a closer coordination with the maneuver element commanders and their fire support officers (FSOs), and the integration of the mortar platoon leader into the staff planning process.

The problem of effective communication is one that is seldom addressed be-

cause of its deceptive simplicity—"Stay awake, stay on the radio, stay on the right frequency, and all of your communication problems will disappear." Unfortunately, effective communication for a battalion mortar platoon is much more than having working radios on the right frequency.

A light infantry mortar platoon normally operates in two sections for survivability. Each section has two gun squads with vehicular radios and a fire direction element with three vehicular radios (one of which can receive only), one AN/PRC-77 radio, and one OE-254 antenna. (During resupply operations, one section loses one vehicular radio, but this rarely hampers that section's ability to respond to fire missions.)

The problem then is not a lack of equipment but the improper management of equipment. On any extended exercise, a certain percentage of a unit's radios are going to go down. It is critical, therefore, that each mortar platoon have the flexibility and technical expertise to move good radios to key vehicles, with the bad radios being taken to the combat trains during normal resupply operations.

Equipment malfunctions aside, the key to effective communication is leader involvement at every level. Leaders must ensure that radio checks are conducted at least hourly with all maneuver element FSOs and with the battalion fire support element (FSE), and that these checks and all fire calls are recorded in a logbook in the FDC. This provides a written record of exactly which units are in contact with the FDC and allows the senior man in each FDC to use alternate channels, either the battalion or the company radio net, to alert a company commander when his FSO is not in contact with the FDC. We found that poor communications frequently could be fixed with something as simple as a new battery, but it took that call on another net to alert a unit that there was indeed a problem.

There are hardly any communication problems that an aggressive, innovative leader cannot fix. The responsibility for good communications rests squarely upon the shoulders of the senior leader present, not upon those of the private on radio watch. During our exercises at the NTC, once leaders at every level became actively involved in communications, significantly more fire support was provided.

The second step on our ascent to effective fire support was a significant increase in the number of coordinations we had with the maneuver element commanders and their FSOs. On some previous missions, for instance, the mortar platoon had not been called because of misconceptions about such matters as its location, range, and capabilities. It quickly became obvious that the flow of information between the mortar platoon leader and the rifle company commanders had to be an ongoing exchange of locations, times, maneuver plans, and expected enemy activity.

ADVISOR ROLE

A mortar platoon leader is responsible for advising the battalion commander on his fire support plan. Because of the decentralization and dispersion in a light infantry battalion, it makes sense for the mortar platoon leader also to advise and make recommendations to the company commanders or FSOs on their fire support plans. Thus, the mortar platoon leader lets each company commander know when that company will be in range, where the mortar platoon will be, the ammunition available, the effects of smoke or illumination rounds, and the support the commander can expect from the 81mm mortar platoon. This not only provides mission essential information but also increases each commander's confidence in the mortar platoon.

If a company commander in contact knows that the supporting mortars are in range, that they are aware of his mission, and that they are expecting to be called (from their monitoring of the battalion net), he is much more likely to yell for his FSO to"Get me some 81s!" than to rely upon an outside unit that may or may not be able to respond.

The main advantages of a battalion mortar platoon are its flexibility, its speed, its high rate of fire, and the fact that it is an organic unit that supports only one battalion. A peacetime mortar platoon leader must constantly "sell" these advantages until the automatic response of each company commander is to call the unit that will best support him in combat.

Perhaps the most significant factor that led to the successful use of our battalion's mortar platoon at the NTC was the integration of the mortar platoon leader into the staff planning process. Immediately upon receipt of each warning order or operations order from higher headquarters, the battalion executive officer would assemble the battle staff to wargame the mission and then present several possible maneuver schemes to the battalion commander. The commander would select a preferred course of action, and the battle staff would develop that plan using the staff planning process, making the modifications needed to match the commander's intent with the intelligence plan of the battle.

The time constraints at the NTC were severe, with operations orders or fragmentary orders coming down to battalion level as little as three or four hours before a mission. By the midway point in our rotation, the planning cycle had necessarily been condensed enough to allow for the preparation of a battalion operations order in just over two hours. A key factor in the presentation of a workable operations order in so little time was the inclusion of every member of the combined arms team in the battle staff. The mortar platoon leader (along with the rest of the battle staff) was briefed by the battalion S-3 on the commander's intent and a rough scheme of maneuver. The S-3 was then able to concentrate on other phases of the planning process while the mortar platoon leader prepared a tentative fire support plan for the 81mm mortar platoon.

The mortar platoon leader worked closely with the battalion FSO to ensure that this plan was in keeping with the FSO's concept of the battalion fire support plan and that they agreed on fire control measures and ammunition loads. The mortar platoon leader then back-briefed the battalion S-3 on his preferred scheme of maneuver and two alternate plans. When one of these was approved by the battalion S-3, the XO, and the commander, it was incorporated into the battalion OPORD. The advantage of this system was that it allowed the battalion "mor-

tar expert'' to devote his full attention to the employment of his weapon systems and freed the S-3 and the battalion FSO to devote their attention to the numerous other tasks they had to accomplish before completing the OPORD.

The mortar platoon leader simply cannot wait for the battalion operations order to be published to find out where he is going to be during an operation. Not only is he more likely to understand how to employ his platoon if he learns earlier, but he also needs the time after the OPORD is issued to conduct the necessary coordination with company commanders and FSOs. Our most successful employment of the mortar platoon occurred at the NTC when this planning process was implemented.

The under-utilization of the mortar platoon, which is mentioned so frequently by mortar platoon leaders, can be cured by an aggressive policy of establishing and maintaining communications, by in-depth coordination between the mortar platoon and each maneuver element commander and FSO, and by the integration of the mortar platoon leader into the staff planning process before the battalion operations order is issued. A light infantry battalion cannot afford to ignore its most responsive indirect fire asset. It is therefore essential for every mortar platoon leader, battalion S-3, and battalion commander to take the necessary steps to ensure that the way their mortars are used in peacetime will lead to victory on the battlefield of tomorrow.

Lieutenant Rene G. Burgess is assigned to the 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, 7th Infantry Division (Light), where he has served as a rifle platoon leader and as a mortar platoon leader. He is a 1984 graduate of the United States Military Academy.

Coordination Trip
For An Off-Post Deployment

CAPTAIN STEVEN D. CAGE

A planned off-post deployment is a precious training opportunity for any infantry battalion. Such a deployment may allow a unit to train in a specific course of instruction, in a different environment or terrain, or just somewhere away from the routine distractions at its homebase. To deploy successfully, a battalion must do a great deal of planning and preparation. This process can be made easier by a well thought-out and executed coordination trip in advance.

A coordination trip is normally conducted (depending on unit SOP) anywhere from 90 to 120 days before the unit's deployment date. The purpose of this trip is to reinforce the initial requests the battalion's project officer has made and the coordination he has started with a personal visit by representatives of the various staff sections in the battalion. The unit may specify who goes, or it may have an SOP covering it; at the least, S-3 and S-4 representatives should go. (They can conduct coordination for the S-1, S-2, and S-5 sections, if necessary.)

Ideally, the selected unit representatives (UREPs) will have been serving as their staff sections' project officers or noncommissioned officers and are familiar with the planning and coordination that has already been done. If they are new to the project, however, they should be fully briefed before taking up their duties.

UNDERSTANDING

Once the UREPs have been chosen, they must become fully conversant with the commander's intent. The initial presentation should be given by either the commander or the executive officer. An understanding of the commander's intent is the most important tool the UREPs can take on the trip; with it, they can sort through all kinds of potential problems or plans that may not quite come out the way they have been coordinated by telephone or mail. In addition, the UREPs can proceed even if the requested training areas are denied, because they will know what the boss wants to do. If it turns out that the location will not meet the standards required, for example, or if the planned training cannot be executed within the framework of the commander's intent, the UREPs can advise him so that the unit's deployment training can be modified or cancelled.

Once the commander's intent is understood, ideally covering all aspects of training and logistics, the UREPs can make their travel arrangements, familiarize themselves with the project to date, get their notebooks, and go.

Most unit deployments that require coordination trips are one of two types: an insertion into and extraction from the field with little or no time in garrison or cantonment area (such as an EDRE followed by an ARTEP), or time in the field or in classes but working out of a cantonment area (such as the Joint Operations Training Center at Fort Sherman, for example).

Both types of deployment primarily re-

S-1/S-4 DEPLOYMENT WORKSHEET

BILLETS:
- Bays? Shower facilities? Telephones?
- Rooms available?
- Arms room facilities? (Chains and locks required?)
- Orderly rooms?
- Unit CP location designated?
- Supply room?
- Communications room?
- Sketch
- Classroom? Capacity?

TRANSPORTATION:
- Advanced Party: POD/Airport to training area
  - Number of vehicles required: Drivers provided?
  - Number support vehicles required:
  - Forklifts available? Flexible hours?
  - Ammunition vehicle available? Flexible hours?
  - Waiting facilities available?
- Main Body: POD/Airport to training area
  - Number vehicles required (buses): Drivers?
  - Number support vehicles required:
  - Commander's vehicle provided?
  - Covered and heated vehicle available?
  - Waiting facilities available?
- Vehicle available at training area for:
  - Commander?
  - Recons?
  - Administrative/logistic use?
  - Medics?
  - Troop movement?
  - Mail?
- Special Needs:
  - Licensing?
  - Signature card required?
  - Fuel fund cite required?

RETURN TRIP:
- Advance party arrangements/Main body arrangements:
  - Training area to airport/POE?
  - Number vehicles required: Drivers provided?
  - Number support vehicles required:
  - Forklifts available? Flexible hours?
  - Ammunition vehicle available: Flexible hours?
  - Waiting facilities available?

SERVICES: LAUNDRY
- Quartermaster available? Cash only?
  Payroll deduction OK?
- Washers/dryers available?
- Contractors available?

MAINTENANCE:
- What level support available?
- Any restrictions?
- Parking area location/size:
- Maintenance bays available?
- Fund cite required? Limit?
- Whose account?
- Wrecker available? Flexible hours?

CLASS I:
- Garrison:
  - Can all use meal cards?
  - Cooks/KPs required? How many?
    Headcount available?
  - Mess hall size? How many can eat at once?
  - Meal hours?
  - How flexible? How can we change?
  - Pick up copy of TISA/DFAC SOP
  - Utensils, plates, glasses available?
  - Resupply available for expendable items?
- Field:
  - Can we draw MREs/tray packs?
    Procedures:
  - How much notice required?
  - Water supply/resupply/transportation to training area?
  - Fund cite required?

CLASS II:
- SSSC Available? Hours?
  - Pick up catalog list
- CIF available? Hours?
  - List items on hand
  - DX available?
  - Permanent or temporary?
  - Clothing sales store available? Hours?
  - MOU required?

CLASS III:
- Fund cite required? Limit?
- Fuel location? Hours? Types?
  How flexible?
- Vehicle refueling capabilities available? Hours?
- Package products available? Where? Hours?
- Request procedure?
- MOU required?

CLASS IV:
- Fund cite required? Limit?
- Construction material available?
  - Nails? Plywood? 2x4s? Concrete?
  - Junk vehicles? Sandbags? Barbed wire?
  - Other?
- Turn-in/clearing requirements?
- MOU required?

CLASS V:
- Transfer possible? How? How flexible?
- Storage facilities? Hours?
- Pick up copy of local SOP
- Issue requirements
- Residue turn-in process
- Field ASP requirements
- Vehicle requirements
- Unique ammo problems (e.g., convoy clearances)?
- MOU required?

CLASS VI:
- PX/Shoppette available? Hours? Flexible?
- Stockage/what's available?
- Special orders possible?
- Barbershop? Hours? Flexible?
- Check cashing facilities? Hours? Flexible?
- MOU required?
- Activities:
  - MWR facilities available?
  - Local tourist areas? Restrictions?
  - Tours available?
  - MWR transportation available?

CLASS VII:
- What's available?
- Loan procedures?
- MOU required?

CLASS VIII:
- Can we order medical supplies? How?
- Closest hospital?
- MEDEVAC procedures?
- Medical platoon area available?
- What is on hand?
- Refrigeration available?
- MOU required?

CLASS IX:
- Fund cite required? Limit?
- Procedure/requirements?
- Fill or kill?
- Maintenance DX capability?
- MOU required?
- Batteries available?

quire training and logistical support, and a deployment that works out of a cantonment area requires administrative and off-duty programs as well. In either case, the UREPs will need to find out and retain a lot of varied information.

One technique for collecting this information is to use deployment worksheets. These worksheets, one for the S-2/S-3 and one for the S-1/S-4, contain words or phrases that are used to request key information. (An S-1/S-4 worksheet is shown here as an example.) This facilitates accurate and helpful note taking. Units with special capabilities or equipment (such as parachutes, for example) can include additional categories (packing facilities, rigger availability, storage areas, drop zone set-up assistance, or whatever else needs to be covered).

In all areas, UREPs must ensure that the names and phone numbers of points of contact, as well as their mail and electronic addresses, are noted so that follow-up questions can be answered or clarifications can be made.

These worksheets can be prepared on a trip-by-trip basis, or the battalion can establish them as its SOP for coordinating trips. In most cases, the S-1/S-4 worksheet can become the coordination trip SOP, because the same information on services and classes of supply will probably be required for every trip. The S-2/S-3 worksheet, however, should probably be developed for each separate deployment, because what the commander plans to get out of one deployment may differ entirely from what he plans to get out of the next. A worksheet can be set up on a day-to-day or mission-to-mission basis, depending upon which seems to work best for tracking the requested and coordinated resources.

When the UREPs arrive at the deployment site, or wherever coordination needs to be made, they should link up with the people the battalion's project officer has been working with. Ideally, these people are expecting the UREPs and are prepared to take them around. This is the time to verify deployment dates; known transportation data; number of soldiers; advance party, main body, and trail party information; and the commander's intent. While these individuals can probably answer most of the UREPs questions, the UREPs also need to get in touch with other sections to get all the answers they need.

The UREPs should talk to every possible point of contact for their listed areas of responsibility and should get range regulations, wire diagrams, unit or school SOPs, Self-Service Supply Center catalogs, or anything else that may help the battalion's deployment planners do their jobs better.

UREPs should make sure all the notes they take are clear and complete. Too, while working with their points of contact at the deployment location, they should come to an understanding about requirements for fund cites or memorandums of understanding. Getting these things clear on this coordination trip may smooth out potential problems later.

Upon their return from the coordination trip, UREPs should finish memorandums of understanding that were not or could not be prepared earlier and back-brief the staff principals and the commander or executive officer. Unless their guidance changes, the next step is for them to write, or help write, the most complete and accurate order, letter of instruction, or annex possible. In short, they should translate all the knowledge they gained on the trip into something the unit can really use.

The last step should be to note any weak or unclear areas on the order. This may mean an addition to or a modification of the deployment worksheet. Once any necessary changes are made, the UREPs can feel confident that the battalion is well on its way to making the most of its off-post training opportunities.

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Leadership

The Human Dimension

CAPTAIN THOMAS P. WEIKERT

Today, more than ever, junior leaders have an obligation to rely less on management skills and more on the basic elements of leadership. Never in the Army's history has there been a greater need for the junior leader to embody the human element of leadership. Compassion, as a fundamental quality of our leadership style, takes on a greater significance as we find ourselves responsible for ever brighter, more responsive, and more highly motivated young soldiers.

For a new lieutenant to be truly effective in what has become a technologically advanced (but still soldier-dependent) infantry, he must focus the development of his leadership style on a commitment to the human dimension of leading

soldiers. The new lieutenant's success as a leader results as much from the development of a sound leadership style as it does from the achievement of tactical and technical proficiency. The human component, an integral part of that leadership style, requires that he identify the needs of his subordinates, demonstrate compassion and loyalty toward them and, finally, simply get along with them.

In the hope that new lieutenants can benefit from my own past experience, I would like to offer a prescription for ensuring a commitment to the human element and also to present some specific situations in which that commitment becomes essential.

Although the thoughts offered here may not be especially illuminating to an officer with a great deal of experience in the infantry, they should provide some useful guidance to a new infantry lieutenant embarking on his first assignment.

As the Army's leadership manual (FM 22-100) indicates quite clearly, a leader must know "how to motivate people in general and [his] subordinates in particular." A successful "motivator" is, by my definition, a leader who is capable of working side-by-side with his charges. He is then, also by my definition, able to "get along" with them. Although this is only one of the factors that contribute to good leadership, it is a critical one.

Those who would disagree could point, of course, to successful battlefield commanders who have relied heavily upon a form of coercive power. It is true that, because of extraordinary personalities or unusual circumstances, such leaders have emerged in combat and even in peacetime and have succeeded. But I believe these are rare exceptions.

Most prominent figures in the Army's history, and especially in the infantry's history, have had the ability to get along with their subordinates and have therefore been able to motivate them. The controversial General George S. Patton, Jr., for example, whom General Omar N. Bradley described as "excessively harsh," clearly relied upon coercion to achieve results. But one of the principles by which he operated was that as soldiers "we can always learn from each other." Patton reportedly believed in doing everything that was expected of the men he commanded, including personally testing his tanks in river crossing operations. Although Patton demanded much of his men, and although many undoubtedly feared him, he was able to work side-by-side with them, and this, I am convinced, contributed to his effectiveness as a leader.

Like Patton, a junior infantry officer in the Army today has to be able to get along with his subordinates. He must not, however, under any circumstances, allow the senior-subordinate relationship to become obscured. In other words, he must recognize the fine line that exists between fraternizing with his soldiers and working among them to accomplish a mission. To ensure that he stays on the right side of that line, he should demand respect and remain in charge. This relationship is critical to his legitimacy as a leader and, when coupled with a willingness to work alongside his men, it should guarantee his success.

To get along with his subordinates, a new lieutenant must also identify their needs. He cannot casually lump together the needs of a group of soldiers; he must get to know them individually. By so doing, he learns something about each one and should eventually be able to recognize what makes each one tick. A little attention to a soldier in the form of care and concern, provided it is genuine, will earn great dividends for a lieutenant.

Identifying a soldier's beliefs and values, as FM 22-100 points out, is critical to the understanding of his personality and the things that motivate him. The indisputable fact is that understanding the diverse personalities found in a platoon requires tremendous effort, patience, and more than a basic understanding of human nature. Because conducting such an analysis is usually less conscious than subconscious, it requires that a platoon leader

have a sincere regard for his subordinates.

At the same time, he must be determined to create an inspired and cohesive small unit that is as capable of performing its peacetime mission as it is prepared to fight a war.

One situation in which it is particularly important for a company grade officer to recognize a subordinate's character make-up and to understand his personality is in considering that subordinate for a job of greater responsibility. Surprisingly enough, sometimes a soldier who has demonstrated either lassitude or an obvious dissatisfaction with his current job will make the best candidate for the new job. Although these are clearly undesirable traits in a subordinate, a soldier who demonstrates this sort of attitude often has reached a point in his development where he feels unfulfilled. If so, giving him a job with more responsibility can serve to rejuvenate him and improve his performance. On the other hand, this kind of attitude may reflect a soldier's feelings about a job that is beyond his capabilities.

The point is that the leader must be able to identify what is causing the poor performance. Only a complete familiarity with a soldier's motives, values, and perhaps goals, coupled with a thorough understanding of human nature, will enable the leader to do this. An analysis of this sort may even help the junior leader at some future time make a responsible decision in a critical situation.

If this kind of compassion and understanding toward subordinates is to be effective, however, it must be genuine. All too often, I have seen junior leaders engage in what amounts to mere cheerleading. Encouragement is important to soldiers but not if they perceive it as phony. In other situations, I have seen junior leaders encourage good performance chiefly to impress their superiors, and there is nothing more damaging to a leader's credibility among his subordinates. A junior leader succeeds only to the extent that his actions are perceived to be in the interest of his subordinates and not self-serving.

Loyalty to subordinates is a powerful tool for the young leader to use in his efforts to gain their respect. Soldiers understand and probably appreciate more than anything else their leader's support in a wide variety of situations. A common one, and one that often proves troubling for a lieutenant, involves disciplinary action.

When called upon to comment on a soldier's poor duty performance or to make a recommendation as to his redemptive value, an officer must consider a number of interests, including that of the unit, the Army, and the individual. A soldier who has committed an indiscretion but has shown a genuinely penitent attitude and no potential for further indiscretions deserves his leader's support.

To make a judgement as to his soldier's potential for slipping further, the leader must again be able to read his character. In many cases, the disciplinary infraction may be just an aberration. The leader must also know his subordinate well enough to determine whether his penitent attitude is sincere. If it is, he can justifiably be compassionate in dealing with an outstanding soldier who has erred and whose career hangs in the balance. And supporting a soldier like this also contributes enormously to a lieutenant's credibility among his other subordinates.

Developing the human dimension in his leadership style should be one of a new lieutenant's most important goals. Being compassionate and trying to understand every soldier's character should guarantee that development. In addition, if he is able to get along with his subordinates, his efforts to lead them will meet with success.

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



TRAINING THE COMPANY XO

Major Walter A. Schrepel

A company commander's success as a leader and manager is directly related to his efficiency in using his key subordinates. Of that group of leaders, the executive officer (XO) and the first sergeant may be the most essential. Since these two are often his most experienced assistants, they can support him in setting the standards for his unit. More important, they can enable him to command the company well by relieving him of the onerous, but necessary, details of company administration.

A new first sergeant may already be well trained to handle his duties on the basis of his previous assignments, but a new XO's level of training may be another matter. Although a junior lieutenant who is moved into the XO's job may have good leadership and tactical skills, these may not have prepared him for the job as the commander's primary officer assistant. But how does a company commander go about training his new officer to be the very best XO possible? A methodical training program may prove quite valuable.

If you are a company commander, I would like to address you directly as a planner, a role model, an instructor, and a mentor. In training a new executive officer, you will play all of these roles.

First, before jumping into a training program, make an estimate of this officer's skills, strengths, and weaknesses. If he is from a line platoon, you may already be familiar with his ability and potential. But if he is a complete stranger to you, you will need to discover all the necessary information about him from his previous commander, or from a thorough review of his past assignments and schooling.

You need to understand his character traits too—his virtues and vices—because they will affect his sense of loyalty, responsibility, and selflessness. Since his approach to his duties may well produce excellence or mediocrity for your command, you will need to be careful in your evaluation.

Consider the full implications of developing the XO's character. FM 22-100 may help you with the specific traits or virtues to instill in him. For example, the ethics of the Army may be a convenient starting place. These days, loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law is no trivial matter to be assumed. Loyalty to the unit, responsibility, and self-

less service all should be the foundation of exemplary ethical service. These criteria provide the broad limits within which moral decisions may be made by all soldiers.

Character traits represent the strengths of a person's moral responsibility—well-formed habits that dispose him to act properly as an officer and as a person. Good leadership and management depend on the strength and direction of these habits. FM 22-100 briefly discusses their contribution to successful leadership, and by assessing the areas you consider essential for the unit, you will establish the standard for ethical conduct. True, these areas are evaluated on the Officer Efficiency Report, but punitive measures should not be your primary concern. Rather, you should use them as the ethical framework for steering the XO's professional conduct in a manner consistent with national values and public expectations. Making him an excellent officer should be viewed as both a professional and a civic duty.

When it comes to technical knowledge, the XO's officer basic course and his previous assignments probably have not prepared him for the wide range of duties you will hand over to him. This deficiency should be remedied immediately because, not only should you be concerned with making him an expert as your XO and second-in-command, he could be your replacement when your command tour ends. You can leave behind no finer testimony of your tenure of command than a well qualified officer as your successor.

In developing his training program, however, do not overestimate his abilities. Review the tasks you will expect him to perform and then match the man to the task. If necessary, prepare a written checklist for him.

METHOD

He will need a systematic method of assembling and retaining the mass of information he will acquire. You might provide him with a green-covered register book for his daily record and references. In it he should record your guidance, his duties, a list of recurring suspenses, points of contact, a list of publications, and any other tips and information that can help him. The book can also serve as a workbook in which he can record notes from meetings, observations, inspections, and other necessary information. The journal should become for him a living document, his job book, and he should use it until it is full. (In the beginning, he may use it as a crutch, but he will soon be able to use it simply as a briefing book and memory aid. You may want to inspect his book occasionally.)

Once you feel comfortable with your preparations, schedule a mission briefing and give him a general overview of his responsibilities in the unit. Explain to him that his instruction will be conducted continuously, with "school" being held every day. Remind him that he will be an active student, conducting readiness inspections of the unit's vehicles and reconciling property receipts. He will also be a passive student as he witnesses your non-judicial punishment sessions and award presentations. His textbook will be the journal he keeps.

You should make arrangements for him to go to battalion headquarters for a series of staff briefings. Ask each staff section to give him a short but informative overview of the various duties that section performs. These briefings should be spread out over several days so that he does not become swamped. You might consider attending the briefings with him so that both of you will receive the same information.

Direct the first sergeant to schedule information and inspection tours of the company facilities. During the tours, the unit staff NCOs can present the respective NBC, supply, and communications rooms in inspection order. This enables the new XO to become knowledgeable about their strengths and weaknesses. With your assistance, the XO can use the information gleaned from the battalion staff briefings to check on potential unit weaknesses. This process also provides the XO with increasing legitimacy as the supervisor of the staff NCOs and builds confidence in the XO's ability to cope with the broad range of his duties.

No training program will be complete without support from available reference materials. Direct the XO to visit the battalion reference library so that he can become intimately familiar with its potential usefulness. The staff briefings should provide him with the publications, regulations, manuals, and pamphlets that will be most important to him as he supervises his areas. In the reference portion of the journal, he should compile a list of these publications for future use. If copies of these materials cannot be maintained in the unit, he should note their location so that he or his subordinates can find and refer to them.

DIRECTED STUDY

Consider starting a directed study program to test his ability to maneuver through these publications. Select a few topics in the field of administration, maintenance, or logistics. Require him, for example, to research the procedures for separations under the provision of AR 635-200. On an appropriate suspense date, have him orally brief you on the information. Requiring him to prepare a complementary memorandum on the subject might be a useful way to test his writing skills as well.

A study program of this kind will force him to come to grips with the regulations. More important, you will be molding into his character a certain courage for tackling the demands of the Army's bureaucracy. That confidence will be worth a great deal as he handles the complex and sometimes confusing administrative regulations that affect your unit's readiness.

All of this theoretical and pedagogical preparation will be of little benefit, however, without some performance training. Selecting a time for synthesizing that knowledge and a practical exercise will depend upon the unit's mission and the XO's individual progress.

When the proper time arrives, have him conduct a logistics exercise. Give him the time he needs to conduct his own troop leading procedures so that he can accomplish a certain difficult but finite mission (such as an equipment readiness and accountability inspection). Give him a mission order complete with tasks, conditions, and standards. Have him go through the entire planning and execution process as if he had received a similar directive from battalion headquarters in preparation

for a special inspection. The completed action would require an estimate, allocation of time and personnel, rehearsals, utilization of key subordinates, and continuous supervision. Either you or the battalion commander could act as the inspecting officer.

In doing an exercise of this kind, the XO will have to put his raw skills into practical action, and the inspection will give you a first-hand opportunity to gauge his capabilities. In the process, weaknesses may be disclosed that provide the agenda for your tutoring, which can lay the foundation for furthering the character development process. The XO will gain increased expertise and confidence, and you will gain a competent assistant.

One way to see that he becomes totally aware of the full scope of company operations is to immerse him in all essential duties. The XO can then complement the first sergeant in supporting you. The exact mix of duties and responsibilities will vary from officer to officer. You may vary the range of duties assigned to a new XO based upon your unit's situation, but keep in mind the needs of both the individual and the unit when assigning his duties.

Be careful that you do not limit his responsibilities to only a few duties, for this would be doing a disservice to both of you. One word of caution: Clearly delineate the responsibilities allocated to the first sergeant and the XO. Some overlap may be desirable so long as no severe jurisdictional conflicts are likely to arise from it.

GARRISON DUTIES

In garrison, the XO can operate as your primary support operator, fireman, and eyes and ears. In preparing for training exercises, he can cross-check the coordination for training support for ranges, road marches, vehicle maintenance, medical support, and extra-battalion support. This support might include requisitioning several echelons of support—Classes I, III, V, VII, and VIII supplies; requisitioning medical aidmen; providing reference materials and maps; researching training and range areas; and planning routes. He can resolve high priority problems ranging from expediting discharges and bars to reenlistment to supervising platoon movements or training sessions. Finally, he can serve as another conduit of privileged information for you so that incipient problems can receive proper command attention.

Supporting the company includes a wide range of responsibilities. To preclude jurisdictional conflicts between the XO and the first sergeant, you might consider forming a headquarters platoon. Command and control of the functional aspects of logistical support would be the XO's responsibilities. The senior headquarters sergeant could operate as the XO's platoon sergeant and be responsive to the first sergeant for routine NCO business. That platoon sergeant would be responsible for accountability and caring for the soldiers in the platoon. In this manner, a cohesive, responsive, professional headquarters might be formed.

The XO should visit the company work areas at least every other day. Section sergeants should brief him daily on the section's activities. A coordination meeting might be held each day to review the priorities for that day. The XO should conduct monthly logistics meetings with the headquarters platoon to review the upcoming company operations. You might also attend this meeting, which should parallel the training meeting, to cross-check the essential support missions for the headquarters. The XO should be aware of all current and pending operations so he can ensure that company training will always be supported. No equipment transfer or loss that might adversely affect training should escape his notice. All such problems should be noted in his journal so that he can brief you later.

In the process of providing support, he should assemble in his journal the working status of the company's key vehicles and weapons. He might develop a miniature version of the briefing chart in his office that outlines the current operational status for weapons (machineguns, TOWs, mortars), radios, and vehicles. The status board might include other useful data for handy reference:

- Calibration schedules.
- Lubrication schedules.
- Equipment readiness status.
- NBC service schedules.
- Equipment transfers and projections.
- Drivers' testing and licensing.
- Assigned drivers
- Furnishings accountability.
- Self-Service Supply account status.

He should maintain a similar chart in your office.

This information will be useful, however, only if it is accurate and fresh. If necessary, the XO should contact each battalion staff section on a daily basis to keep current in these areas as well as in the status of his various additional duties. You may also want him to be vigilant in the areas shown in Table 1.

S-1/ MEDICAL PLATOON	S-2
Accident reports	CEOI security
Discharge packets	Key and lock inventories
Award packets	Guard duty coordination
Personal deployment readiness folders	Building security
	Deployment security
S-3	**S-4/MAINTENANCE**
Training area/range area requests	Property accountability
Training records	Hand receipts
Ammunition requests	Equipment transfers
Key weapon readiness	Expendable items
	Vehicular maintenance
	Deployment logistics
	Driver training

Table 1

Your continued checking at this stage is vital in keeping the new XO on the right track. It will probably be necessary to have him back-brief you daily so that you can follow his progress and suggest solutions in the interest of saving time.

Planning exercises for him will be useful in developing his

skills, but this should not be the end of your active involvement. Whenever possible, have him witness various personnel actions as you handle them. Ask him for his opinion on what course of action to take on a discharge, for example. Allocate some time to explain the justification for your own action so that he can better understand your method of command. After all, he will be acting commander when you are on leave, and you would not want any discontinuity during your absence. Letting him witness your training meetings, letters of admonition, promotions, counseling sessions, and especially non-judicial punishments will give him invaluable experience.

Use your suspense chart as a conceptual framework for discussing recurring suspenses. Daily coordination should emphasize your priorities on the matters that urgently need attention and on those that are merely important. Quiz him on his plans for attacking an issue, having him always find the best course of action.

Your training of the XO should not obscure his own duty to train his headquarters platoon, because these soldiers must be just as ready to perform in the field as those in the line platoons. Give him a slice of time in your training meetings to plan individual and collective training for his sections.

Direct him to plan occasional headquarters training exercises in the company area that will burnish the field skills of his platoon. During support cycles, the headquarters platoon could set up a command post in the areas adjacent to the company area and could perform the usual activities from a tent instead of the supply room. Communications personnel could lay a landline to the company, test equipment, and maintain equipment in a simulated field environment. Other personnel could practice radio telephone precedures for jamming, encoding, decoding, and journal keeping. Various training activities—camouflage, passive NBC defense, small arms defense against aircraft, radio operator procedures, antenna construction, among others—could easily be incorporated into the exercise.

If the XO has done his job well, the company should be well prepared to head to the field training area. Once in the field, employ him as your primary logistical operator. While the first sergeant handles personnel and weapons accountability and Class I resupply, you might allocate supply and maintenance responsibilities to the XO. Some of these areas may include those shown in Table 2.

When possible, cut him loose from his logistical tasks by replacing him with another lieutenant (to start the process anew with his potential replacement). Employ the XO as your stand-in during tactical exercises, and have him accompany you to the orders briefings so that he can better see the "big picture." Let him perform the leader's reconnaissance and route planning, and have him select an assembly area site and prepare the actual movement plan. As his mentor, also allow him to prepare and deliver the operation order to the platoon leaders to give him a taste of command. If the situation permits, place him in actual control of the exercise.

S-1/MEDICAL PLATOON	S-2
Ambulance support	CEOI security Maps
S-3	**S-4/MAINTENANCE**
Weapon readiness Weapon qualification Range coordination Route planning	Class III, V, VII Water Trash collection Contact teams Transportation

Table 2

The success of this procedure depends upon the XO's personal skills, which may have become a bit rusty since his last deployment to the field. Remind him through an occasional examination of his map reading or radio skills during the headquarters training exercises. His ability to respond to a field situation will again depend upon your mentoring in order for him to get the most from this training opportunity. He may have to assume command during an exercise or ARTEP; his tactical skills must not become impaired because he has misunderstood the priorities.

The utility of this training program may seem obvious to many who have been involved in similar situations. We often have the best intentions in executing training but may, unfortunately, become overwhelmed by events to the point of procrastinating and doing shoddy work. A training program such as this, with its standards and objectives, can help a commander rise to the challenge.

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



Captain Robert R. Leonhard

COUNTER - RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY

The value of reconnaissance during operations has been recognized since antiquity. Although some great captains have been obliged to fight without it from time to time (Frederick the Great comes to mind, for example), none has ever done so happily. With the emergence of greater tactical mobility and the increasingly destructive power of today's weapons, thorough and systematic reconnaissance is of even greater importance. But only fairly recently have we begun to apply ourselves to the logistical converse of reconnaissance—counter-reconnaissance.

Counter-reconnaissance must be treated as a separate doctrine, not simply an extension of screening or fighting a covering force battle. From counter-reconnaissance operations, certain principles have evolved that set these missions apart from other tactical missions and provide the key to successfully blinding the enemy. A counter-reconnaissance effort requires special considerations that touch on deployment, use of time, task organization, and logistical priorities.

In trying to meet the challenge of the "fight before the fight," our battalion developed a new concept—a counter-recon company team. This idea evolved as we renewed the emphasis on specialization and mission stability. Thus, each of the company teams was given a handful of standard missions so that the leaders and soldiers would have an opportunity to perfect a small number of drills. Our particular task force organization (see box) led the commander to designate Team C as our counter-reconnaissance force.

TEAM A	TEAM B	TEAM C	TEAM D
A/1-6 IN (-)	B/1-13 AR (-)	C/1-6 IN (-)	B/1-37 AR (-)
1/B/1-37 AR	2/C/1-6 IN	1/B/1-13 AR	2/A/1-6 IN
CO E (ITV)	TF CON	Engineer Plt	
E/1-6 IN	Scout Plt	Stingers/Vulcans	
	Hvy Mortar Plt		

This team included two mechanized platoons, an organic ITV section, a tank platoon of four tanks, a fire support team (FIST) with a FISTV (fire support team vehicle) and, depending upon the situation, a Stinger or Vulcan team (or both), an engineer platoon or squad, and sometimes operational control of the scout platoon. One section of heavy mortars was usually in direct support of the team.

Of primary consideration in our development of counter-reconnaissance techniques was the nature of the threat. Soviet doctrine and feedback from the National Training Center (NTC) indicate that the time of intense reconnoitering is the night and early morning before an attack. The Soviets' most common reconnaissance plan provides first for several small groups of dismounted infantrymen or scouts to attempt stealthy penetration into the defender's main positions and beyond. Secondly, just before they attack, and often in daylight, the Soviets attempt to rush several reconnaissance vehicles past the defender's screen and into the main positions. Both of these efforts are directed at pinpointing the defender's dispositions, reconnoitering routes to the objective, and finding and reducing obstacles. Total Soviet forces during these reconnaissance operations usually do not exceed a reinforced company.

"And Moses sent them to spy out the land of Canaan, and said, 'Get you up . . . and see the land . . . and the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many.'" (Numbers 13:17-18)

Counter-reconnaissance depends upon the application of several principles, the first of which is *dispersion*. In a reconnaissance battle, the counter-recon force not only *can* disperse, it *must* disperse. Because of the nature of the threat (small, independent groups of vehicles), the counter-recon force can afford to disperse much more than it normally would. My battalion commander therefore directed that the company cover from five to seven kilometers of terrain, compared to the norm of about one kilometer of frontage on a standard defense mission. In brief, the counter-recon company must disperse if the commander wants to win the reconnaissance fight without committing additional forces. Thus, dispersion is one of the chief characteristics of a counter-reconnaissance fight, and it also influences several other considerations.

The second principle is the need to *concentrate on the kill.* That is, the counter-recon mission is only the means to an end; the end itself is the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's reconnaissance elements. This factor transforms the counter-recon mission into an active, mobile, and violent experience rather than a static occupation of outposts. It also affects deployment and command and control considerations.

The third principle is directed at the battalion commanders and S-3s who plan the use of counter-recon forces—they must consider the *cost* of the mission when deciding whether it will pay off. Since virtually the entire force must stay awake, alert, and moving during operations, and since operations typically last from the afternoon of one day until mid-morning of the next, time for rest and recuperation must be planned. The risk level is also germane to the decision, because dispersion makes the counter-recon mission a dangerous one, even under the best circumstances (an accurate intelligence picture, good communications, and the like). But the most "expensive" part of the mission is *time*. Leaders' recons, re-assembly, and withdrawal all take a good deal of time, even with a well-trained force.

The fourth principle is *reinforcement*. Because of dispersion and the short duration of skirmishes between reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance elements, the highest level at which units can expect to fight together is platoon. When enemy reconnaissance elements are contacted, often the fire teams and squads of the counter-recon force will find themselves on their own. It is important, therefore, to plan for and rehearse both fire support and reinforcement at squad and platoon level and not to waste time trying to reinforce at company team level.

Command and control during counter-recon operations is much more difficult than it is under normal circumstances. Obviously, communications are vital—indispensable, in fact. The task force command net is needed for intelligence updates (which are critical for timing the withdrawal), coordination with the scout platoon, and, to avoid fratricide, lateral coordination with other friendly forces during the withdrawal. The team command net is the fire support net for platoons and squads, and it is the *only* way to coordinate a safe, effective withdrawal. Thus, if communications are disrupted, the counter-recon company mission cannot be accomplished and should not be attempted.

"There is no great art to devising a good plan of operations. The entire difficulty lies in this: to remain faithful in action to the principles we have laid down for ourselves." (Clausewitz, On War)

To facilitate command and control, we decided on the split-command approach. That is, the executive officer commanded one half of the battlefield (under the team commander's overall control) while the team commander directly controlled the other. We found that small mistakes had a tendency to snowball because of the dispersion factor. During one counter-recon mission, the ITV section received a copy of an overlay on which one of the grid designators was off by one number. That section ended up ten kilometers away from its assigned spot and took the rest of the night to rejoin the team.

Finally, there is the principle of the *withdrawal*. This is at once the most dangerous aspect of the mission, the most crucial to the overall success, and the most difficult to plan and control. A word of explanation is needed: The withdrawal is the decisive part of the mission, because if it does not succeed the counter-recon mission is degraded from an effective economy of force measure into a waste (in our particular case) of one-fifth of the maneuver strength of the task force. Multiple routes must be planned, reconnoitered, and understood by all, including the forces on the forward edge of the battle area.

There are several techniques for actually conducting coun-

ter-reconnaissance operations, some of which are applicable to any counter-reconnaissance operation (company team level or lower).

First, the use of daylight for leaders' recons is indispensable: A leader who can't afford the time shouldn't attempt the mission. I have found that the leader's recon must be well-planned as an integral part of the whole operation. Typically, I leave the first sergeant or a platoon sergeant to conduct assembly area procedures (having already issued a warning order), and I depart with the XO, the platoon leaders, the ITV section leader, the FIST, other attachments, and as many squad leaders as we can fit in the tracks. We generally take at least three vehicles, sometimes as many as five—the commander's and mechanized platoon leaders' tracks and sometimes the FISTV and the XO's track.

The recon team proceeds to the counter-recon release point, where the commander and the leaders dismount and conduct a map reconnaissance. The mechanized platoon leaders and the XO then go to their areas to plan for their squad deployments, fire support, platoon release points, and platoon command posts. In addition, the radio-telephone operators establish wire communication to the squad leaders' positions.

Meanwhile, the commander and the tank platoon leader recon the tank positions, and the fire support officer (FSO) and the commander plan for fires. The company communications sergeant works on establishing wire communications to the platoon command posts if possible (it often isn't because of distance, the nature of the terrain, and time). When the platoon leaders are finished (or when their time runs out), they return to the company CP and brief the commander and the FSO on their plan. They then go to the release point where they await their platoons.

The company team commander's most important role in the counter-recon mission is determining the initial deployment of the team. He will find that the battle is largely in the hands of team, squad, and platoon leaders when the shooting starts, but his deployment of the subordinate units, usually based mainly on a map reconnaissance, will decide the success of the mission. He must strive to counter the effects of dispersal so the squads have a reasonable area of terrain with which to work (that is, not too large). This usually translates into conducting a good intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), determining the most likely dismounted avenues of approach, concentrating infantry killer teams there, and covering the rest of the unoccupied terrain by observation and patrols.

We initially tried to use platoon early warning systems (PEWS) to cover the gaps *between* units, but this deployment was ineffective; although we could detect any enemy troops who penetrated there, we could not kill them. A better technique is to place PEWS forward of friendly killer teams in order to alert friendly troops.

Good fire support plans are critical to the success of the mission. Since the squad leaders fighting the skirmishes can expect little or no reinforcement during the fight, they must compensate with effective fires from the 4.2-inch mortars or artillery if it is available. One technique that will facilitate such fires is to include the frequency and call sign of the mortars in paragraph five of the operations order to ensure that the squad leaders have the right information. Also, if the battalion commander approves, it is helpful to have the mortars operate on the company team net. It is important that the squad leaders have access to extra PRC-77 radio batteries since the duration of the mission may deplete even a fresh battery.

Tanks are an important part of the counter-recon team, and they require special consideration on the part of the team commander. The use of the TTS thermal sights on our M60A3s provided a mixed blessing. While the increased vision at night helped cover the gaps between the infantry platoons, the need to start the tanks to keep the batteries alive had obvious drawbacks. One of our more successful aggressor teams heard a tank start its engine 1,500 meters away and vectored in on it with ease.

As we groped about for a solution, we tried several approaches. First, the noise of the tanks can be used to deliberately draw the enemy into an ambush, executed by either the infantry or the tank platoon itself. This is a highly risky approach, however, because a smart enemy can use this technique against the counter-reconnaissance force. His dismounted teams, for example, can by-pass known locations easily and penetrate beyond your counter-recon positions.

Another solution is to rely on "tank watches tank" techniques in which two tanks search the gaps while the other two passively provide security for the active ones. This cuts the commander's tank strength in half, but we found that it was the preferred method of overcoming noise problems.

As we trained for the counter-recon fight against aggressors, the most common reason for failing to win occurred at squad level—the failure to "own the battlefield." It is critical for the squad members of the infantry platoons to aggressively deny the battlefield to the enemy. Every noise, every hint of the enemy's dismounted reconnaissance elements must be investigated and hunted down. Night observation devices must be in constant operation, and the paranoia level among soldiers must be high. Although this puts a drain on the troops, there is no other way to win the counter-recon fight.

The withdrawal, the decisive part of the counter-reconnaissance fight, must be planned as the critical phase of the battle. The use of readiness conditions (REDCONs) helps a lot. As the team commander receives the intelligence picture from the S-2 (or infers it from the platoon leaders' reports), he should selectively increase the REDCON of the units from 30 minutes (in which the platoons recover camouflage nets and the like) to five minutes (in which the patrols are recalled). When enemy casualties indicate the withdrawal, destruction, or neutralization of the enemy's reconnaissance company, the withdrawal must begin.

Since the worst thing that can happen at this point is a total loss of command and control, the counter-recon force should have rehearsed the withdrawal sequence ahead of time, and each platoon should now be able to execute its part independently. It is also important that the mortar section in support of the force be available to fire immediate smoke missions as necessary.

As the withdrawal begins, to avoid fratricide the team commander must notify units on the FEBA and if possible these units should be included in any rehearsals that can be conducted. Counter-recon elements should rally at a predesignated point and reorganize as necessary. From there, they should deploy to a refit, re-arm, refuel point and finally into a battle position behind the forward units, where the force can prepare for the defense—and then rest. This scenario assumes, of course, a counter-reconnaissance fight as part of a task force defense.

Some people may think that committing an entire company team to a counter-reconnaissance mission is a heavy-handed approach. To reply that "it depends on the situation" will not suffice. Rather, our battalion has concluded that employing a properly trained team judiciously in the "fight before the fight" will indeed yield good results. Assuming an aggressive fight by the squad leaders, effective positioning by the team commander and platoon leaders, and a timely and fast withdrawal, the use of a counter-reconnaissance company is an excellent economy of force tool.

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Infantry In Action

Guerrilla Battalion, U.S. Style

David H. Hackworth

By mid-1969 the 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry had set Vietnam's guerrilla-dominated Delta on fire. This battalion's achievements weren't accomplished with conventionally trained soldiers, led by conventionally oriented leaders, but by American soldiers who fought and thought like their guerrilla foes and by leaders who followed Mao's handbook on guerrilla warfare.*

Since early January 1969, the battalion, known as the "Hardcore Battalion" throughout the 9th Infantry Division, had lived and fought under virtually the same harsh and demanding conditions as the Viet Cong. The troopers had become lean and hard, and had the sort of pride that comes only from sacrifice. There were no suburban luxuries like cold beer and tape recorders, for example. According to one expert on guerrilla warfare, the Hardcore Battalion had become more proficient at this form of warfare than the elite guerrilla units that they challenged daily in western Dinh Tuong Province. The helicopters and air strikes helped, but the attitude of the men was the determining factor.

Surprise, deception, mobility, imagination, cunning, and familiarity with every stream, trail, hamlet, and village within the area of operation (AO) were the characteristics of Hardcore's tactics. The battalion acquired an ability to move at night with stealth and ease, and when it struck, it struck hard. The catalyst for all of this was alertness, which came to be the cardinal requirement.

Little dependence was placed on the sophisticated machinery of modern warfare. The helicopter was viewed not as some magic panacea for winning the war, but as a vehicle to move men into battle. Ground radar, sniffers, technical intelligence devices, and countless other mechanical gimmicks that had been developed to bring a quick and easy solution to the war were used, but only as a means to an end. They weren't considered an end in themselves. The battalion's concept was that machinery doesn't win battles. Battles are won only by trained, dedicated, highly motivated men who are expertly led.

As guerrillas, the Hardcore Battalion adopted the Asian's contempt for time, and they never hurried. They were slow, careful and methodical. In strict accordance with Mao's rules of guerrilla warfare, they would fight only when victory was assured at a minimal cost in friendly casualties. The battalion's most priceless assets were its troopers, and their safety was always uppermost in the commander's mind. If an element had to attack across an open rice paddy through antipersonnel mines to take a bunkered position just to kill a few enemy, then forget it! No attack would be made. "We'll strike it hard with artillery and air, sneak to their rear and ambush them as they try to run away," would be the solution.

This talk of safety shouldn't imply timidness or reluctance, for the battalion was bold and took risks few units would take, providing the game would be played according to their rules.

The battalion's primary tactic was the ambush. Its units operated in widely decentralized platoon or smaller formations, normally over a 50-kilometer AO. Obviously, this type of employment required small unit leaders of exceptional skill. Weak leaders were replaced. Company commanders were hand-picked, ideally had two previous Vietnam tours, and possessed the ability to operate independently as guerrilla chieftains.

Company commanders trained with an Australian Infantry company for four weeks, where they learned platoon and company tactics from the finest jungle fighters in the world. In addition, all leaders (staff sergeant and above) were required to read battalion-prepared counterinsurgency handbooks which spelled out in detail how they were expected to operate. This theoretical instruction was augmented by a minimum of two weeks on-the-job training with a proven guerrilla leader. Here the new leader learned tricks that weren't taught at West Point

**This is an edited version of an article that appeared in INFANTRY, January-February 1971, pages 22-27.*

or Fort Benning, but that they needed to know in order to outfox the fox.

The battalion's basic organization was drastically modified to facilitate the ambush concept. All rifle company heavy weapons platoons were converted into rifle platoons. The battalion was stripped down by eliminating extraneous equipment. The battalion's reconnaissance and heavy mortar platoons were transformed into a sniper and special action force respectively.

Each of the rifle companies was assigned a specific tactical mission. Each was given broad guidance, time to conduct needed special training, and maximum latitude in developing and preparing its organization.

Company A became the long-range ambush company and was organized into two 60-man heavy platoons. Its mission was to operate on the periphery of the battalion's AO. One platoon was always deployed, while the other stood down, resting and training. The deployed platoon would normally enter the target area by helicopter several hours before dusk, as part of another company that would be assigned a target in that area. While the airmobile force, or "jitterbug," was on the ground, the heavy ambush platoon would go into hiding. After dark, the platoon would move to its first ambush site, to set up where there was evidence of frequent enemy movement.

The platoon used artillery defensive concentrations (DEFCONs), dug deep, carefully camouflaged its positions, and conducted limited local patrolling around its base. Movement during daylight and helicopter overflights were forbidden. The ground commander moved his ambush when he had concluded the fish would no longer bite, or in concert with future battalion plans. This platoon normally stayed out six days and was picked up by helicopter after its sister element was inserted in another area. The company commander occasionally went out with a platoon to set the example and check on operations. Normally, he remained at his company base camp monitoring operations, prepared to lead the stand-down platoon or the initial reinforcement element, and planning future operations.

AMBUSH

Company C was assigned the mission of conducting short-range ambush operations. The company was organized into four identical platoons; each night three platoons would establish ambushes within 10 kilometers of the battalion firebase, while the remaining platoon would stand down.

The commanders of Alfa and Charlie companies were each assigned a general area of operations and given maximum independence and latitude. Their ambush commanders in turn would conduct detailed intelligence collection, reconnaissance, and other necessary troop leading procedures. Once they had selected the exact ambush sites, they would present a detailed briefing to the battalion commander.

It wasn't long before these two commanders knew the battlefield better than they knew their own personnel files. Most contacts were with small enemy forces at night, which were moving by sampan or on trails alongside canals. Contacts were violent and brief. Claymores and fragmentation grenades were the main weapons, and small arms were seldom used. The surprise effect was so great that the VC normally died in the killing zone without returning fire. At first light the killing zone would be swept and enemy weapons, documents, and other materiel would be secured for eventual evacuation to battalion.

Both ambush companies conducted all operations by the book—air recons, rehearsals, sandtable briefings, detailed before-mission personnel inspections. The battalion staff spot-checked all stages of the before-mission preparations.

Bravo and Delta companies were organized similar to Korean War-vintage Ranger companies. These units were the guerrilla companies and rotated on operational missions. One company would stand down at the fire support base (FSB) and serve as the battalion reaction force, while its sister unit would operate in a clearly defined AO. The areas were selected after a meticulous intelligence profile was made. Every intelligence source available to the battalion was used, from the super-secret black box in the delta-winged jet to the wrinkled brown farmer who tilled the rice paddy. When completed, the intelligence profile blinked like a neon light that pointed a bright red arrow at the enemy. The guerrilla companies conducted the same exacting pre-operation preparations as the ambush companies. Nothing was missed.

JITTERBUG

The guerrilla company normally entered its AO by a night overland march or as a last insert on a "jitterbug." When the airmobile insertion was used, the birds would return to the landing zone after the company had concealed itself in a hiding position and conduct a false pick-up. As the slicks came in for the pick-up, the aircraft doors would be open. But on lift-off they would be closed, to deceive a sharp-eyed enemy who might be observing from the distance. After dark, the company would move to its ambush sites and set up. The exact number of ambushes depended on the ground commander's estimate, based on the tired but true cliche: the enemy, terrain, and weather. At first light the company would assemble, dry out from a long night of soaking in the Delta paddies, and sleep. Only outguards would remain alert and provide security.

At about 1500 hours, the company would commence checkerboarding in the direction of its next night ambush location. The rear guard platoon always would go into a "hide" location as close as possible to the "dry out" position and then sneak back as a stay-behind force. The batting average for kills by these stay-behind elements never slipped below .500.

When moving, the company always traveled along concealed routes in multiple columns, with scout elements out front. Normally, contact was with squad-size enemy forces which would easily be dealt with. When larger forces were found, the find 'em, fix 'em, fight 'em rule wasn't applied; the Hardcores had better ways. The find 'em force would draw back to a position that provided good cover, and then maximum tactical air and artillery was employed. Battalion would drop other

noncommitted units astride the likely enemy escape routes. Tactical air and artillery would pour in on the enemy, and the loose net would be slowly concentrated until it became virtually impossible for the enemy force to escape.

All units traveled light. Only essential equipment was taken. For the soldier this meant weapon, ammunition, load-bearing equipment, poncho, rations, and air mattress. The standard 70-pound rucksack, which is so popular with many U.S. units, was forbidden. Resupply aircraft weren't used and units lived off the land, just like their guerrilla opponents. Medevac was summoned only for the seriously wounded. The lightly wounded and moderately sick went along with their units. Everyone realized that once a chopper came near the element, the operation was compromised, and the enemy would know the exact locations and intentions of the friendlies.

Stealth was one of the main weapons of the Hardcore Battalion. Every soldier was required to memorize the rules of Rogers' Rangers, and leaders were charged with their enforcement.

The sniper platoon was a 15-man element commanded by one of the sharpest lieutenants in the battalion. His command consisted of 7 two-man sniper teams of handpicked volunteers. These sniper teams received comprehensive training conducted by the 9th Division's Sniper School. They wore a special uniform, received quick promotions, and had high priority on awards. In short, they were the spoiled children of the battalion commander and everyone knew it. Consequently, men fought to become snipers.

During the day, four sniper teams were employed, while two were used at night and one stood down. The day sniper teams would be augmented by three volunteers from headquarters company. This would make a five-man team: two snipers, one RTO, and two security men. Each day at 1600, Sniper 6 met with the short-range ambush commander and the battalion commander to outline the planned sniper activity for that night and the following day. Adjustments would be made to insure that Company C's short-range ambushes and other battalion activities would be complemented by the sniper operation. At first light, a slick, escorted by a gunship, inserted each of the five-man teams individually in a 10-kilometer area around the FSB. By dawn the teams were in a concealed position, had set up all-around security, and had commenced their search for enemy soldiers. Just before dusk, the teams would be picked up and returned to the FSB. The night teams, working with starlight scopes and pink filters, would normally set up at Regional Forces outposts. Sniper 6 would select the exact sites, based on intelligence, and conduct necessary coordination with the district chief.

The special action force was an 18-man volunteer platoon composed of 12 Vietnamese-sized Americans and six Tiger Scouts (former enemy soldiers who had changed to the government's side and volunteered to work as scouts). This force, operating in black pajamas, armed with Russian AK47s and other captured Communist equipment, conducted covert operations such as prisoner snatches, collection of intelligence, or special reconnaissance missions. Lieutenant Colonel Trinquer's book on French Army guerrilla tactics, *Modern Warfare,* served as their bible.

Jitterbug operations were normally conducted every third day by the stand-down guerrilla company. These operations were tightly controlled by the battalion commander and his staff. The day before the operation, an intelligence analysis would be made of the battalion's area of influence. District, Province, RF, PF, U.S. Special Forces, ARVN units, higher headquarters, and the battalion's own agent net were squeezed for the last drop of information. Targets were selected and priorities assigned based upon many factors, such as target perishability, optimum blade-time utilization, location of friendly units, placement of supporting fires, and probable enemy strengths. Next, the battalion CO, S-2, and S-3 attended a target meeting at brigade. Here, each target was discussed in detail, and additional brigade or division targets were assigned, based on "hotter dope." By midnight the target priorities had been finalized and about 20 blue target circles would be printed on a map. At first light the command and control (C&C) aircraft and the air cavalry commander arrived at the FSB and were briefed with the Infantry CO on targets, call-signs, frequencies, pick-up zones (PZs), landing zones (LZs), unit SOPs, rearm and refuel points, and air cavalry reconnaissance zones.

INITIAL LIFT

At the designated hour the air cavalry troop moved to its reconnaissance zones, the C&C bird headed toward the first target, and the initial lift of Infantry moved into a PZ formation. The C&C bird carried a minimum of six Air Force CS canisters. If, in the commander's judgment, the target appeared not worth striking—this would be based on lack of fresh trail activity or recent signs of enemy movement, gut feeling, and other tell-tale signs of the enemy—a CS canister might be kicked out, followed by gunship reconnaissance fire. If the CS and machinegun fire didn't stir things up, the target might be scratched.

If the second target looked good, a rifle platoon would be inserted. The gunships and a forward air controller would cover the platoon while it searched out the target area. If no contact was made, the C&C would move to the next target, and the Infantry at the second target would move into a PZ formation. This procedure would be followed all day and would be broken only if solid contact was made. Based on the size of the contact, Infantry troops and adequate combat support would pile on the contact to seal the enemy force. Experience gained by the Hardcore Battalion makes this axiom ring true when jitterbugging: there is a direct correlation between the number of inserts and the number of contacts made. Maximum inserts result in a high number of contacts. But great care must be taken to insure that the small Infantry force doesn't bite off more than it can handle, for it can be harshly treated by a clever enemy waiting in ambush.

The PPS-5 ground radar tracked the enemy's movement at night and was normally set up at a district headquarters, or with RF or PF outposts. This way, it could scan the deployed ambush patrols more effectively. Permanent overlays were made of all radar movement, and future ambush patrols and sniper employment were based on these overlays. The radar provided the battalion with the enemy's movement pattern. It wasn't an uncommon event for an ambush patrol to be notified, "You have 10 VC moving on the trail you are on. They are 400 meters from your position and moving in your direction." All enemy activity that wasn't moving toward an ambush position was plastered by artillery fire.

The VC closely follow Mao's dictum: "Our duty is to fight a protracted war, avoiding the enemy if possible, never engaging him unless it can be made certain in advance that it is to our advantage." As a result of this strategem, the enemy was always eager to attack a small U.S. force that appeared an easy target.

VARIATIONS

The Hardcores used the following technique, or variations, to tempt their greedy opponent: A small Infantry force would be inserted by helicopter at last light and set up near the LZ. After dark it would move, leaving a clearly defined trail for enemy scouts to follow, and link up with one of the guerrilla companies that had carefully slipped into the AO. This trap brought results more times than not. On two occasions, multiple company-size enemy forces struck what they thought was a weak platoon, only to find a well dug-in, reinforced rifle company that was locked and loaded. What the enemy thought was a tender lamb was instead a sinewy tiger.

The 4th Battalion, 39th Infantry, being a band of guerrillas, had its own unit training program. Each week two platoons would slip from the FSB to the division rear for a rigorous one-week training program. This program used all the assets of the division training facilities and was closely monitored by the battalion executive officer. The troopers looked forward to this week. They knew they would train hard for a minimum of 12 hours a day, but they also knew they could relax and forget about hunting Charlie for a while. The training program paid rich dividends: morale went up, casualties went down, and the battalion became a little sharper at outwitting the guerrilla.

The tactical innovations discussed here weren't played as separate musical instruments with each musician doing his own thing. They were employed in close concert with each other, closely controlled by the battalion commander. One example:

Early morning, 21 May 1969, intelligence indicated that a large enemy force was staging to the north of FSB Danger. At 0700 a special action force element was dispatched, with the mission "get a prisoner." Simultaneously, two battalion-controlled civilian agents were told to infiltrate the suspected

enemy assembly area to determine the size and mission of the enemy force.

The agents and the SAF element were back by 1000. SAF didn't have a POW to show for its efforts, but it had made contact with an enemy patrol and killed four of them. One of the KIA was the reconnaissance company commander of the 261A VC Battalion. Found on him was a map showing attack plans against a nearby RF company, including company objectives, movement routes, supporting weapons sites, and most importantly, the exact location of each assembly area for all the companies in the 261A Battalion. The agents confirmed that it was 261A and concluded that it was ready to jump off.

The Hardcore commander deduced that the attack on the RF company was of secondary importance. The enemy's objective was to frighten the people of Giao Duc, for if an RF company could be destroyed right under the noses of a U.S. battalion, how secure was the average peasant?

The enemy's plan might have worked had the American opponent been a unit that played by ordinary rules. But this opponent was a guerrilla like himself, who cheated and read his hand, then stacked the deck.

The U.S. battalion readied itself for combat. Holes weren't bored in the sky by helicopters circling over the target. Nor was artillery and tactical air placed blindly on red dots on the map marking VC locations. Helicopters weren't hastily assembled for an ill-planned airmobile assault. The battalion knew that the enemy would be gone slick as a whistle before the lead ship set down on the LZ.

Experience had taught this lesson well. The VC couldn't be destroyed by conventional tactics employed by the average U.S. battalion in Vietnam. Only guerrilla tactics augmented by U.S. firepower could defeat the enemy at low cost.

The target was perishable. The enemy wouldn't linger long in the assembly area. He would either attack soon or slink away. He had to be baited to stay one more night. Two M41 dusters, with potent twin 40mm cannons, and a rifle platoon were moved to the RF outpost to reinforce it. It was hoped that this would cause the enemy to reassess his attack plans, thus buying time. False helicopter insertions were made along all the enemy's probable withdrawal routes, to cause him to think twice before running away into a possible hornet's nest of ambushes.

After these deceptive measures were taken to keep the bird in the cage, the following concept of operations was outlined to the commanders:

Each rifle company would be divided into two parts. Half the battalion, operating under company control, would in-

filtrate at dark and establish ambush positions by 0600 on 22 May. The other half of the battalion, less one heavy platoon from Company A, which would be the battalion reaction force, would conduct a combat assault at first light. The combat assault force's mission wasn't to become decisively engaged, but to serve as the beater and get the rabbit running.

All preparations were carefully concealed. The battalion knew that the VC constantly observed all U.S. installations, searching for signs of unusual activity. Harassing and interdiction (H&I) fires weren't increased. Reconnaissance wasn't allowed and everything at FSB Danger went on its normal merry routine.

After dark the ambush forces moved out. Long lines of ghostly columns moved silently along separate infiltration routes toward their critical blocking positions. Stealth was the key. One careless movement could blow the show.

At 0600 all ambush elements were in position and the stage was set to spring the trap. At 0700 the airmobile force was launched. Once the beaters were on the ground, the enemy reacted as if it were an aggressor force at Fort Benning and followed the scenario according to plan.

All morning long the enemy tried to escape. He couldn't hide because heavy artillery fire, tactical air, and gunships blasted all possible hiding positions. There wasn't one inch of ground that he could use to escape this murderous fire or the probing thrusts of the airmobile search force.

By 1200 the enemy command structure had disintegrated. Enemy soldiers ran in every direction, only to be cut down by gunships or battalion sniper teams attached to the maneuver elements.

By 1800 the fight was over. All elements of the battalion had departed the battlefield except Company C, which went into a hide position after a false helicopter pick-up. That night their ambushes killed 17 VC who had hidden in reeds all day and tried to escape under cover of darkness. Friendly casualties: two U.S. slightly wounded. Enemy casualties: 167 KIA, seven POWs, and numerous weapons captured.

This ends the story of a battalion that used radical techniques to win. Yet these techniques weren't new. Marion had used the same unorthodox tricks at Cowpens, as had Rogers against the French at Detroit. The Hardcores had simply updated the tactics of our guerrilla forefathers and given them a 1969 Vietnam twist.

From January to late May 1969 the Hardcore Battalion killed over 2,700 enemy soldiers with a loss of 26 troopers. But more important, the western portion of Dinh Tuong Province was made secure. The people of Giao Duc identified with the government. An average of eight members of the Viet Cong infrastructure rallied to the Giao Duc District force per week. The enemy's main force units were shattered and rendered ineffective. There was light at the end of the tunnel in one small area of South Vietnam.

TRAINING NOTES

Combat Tips
From An Old Doggie

DAVID J. DAZE

Since World War II when I served in combat, many publications have done a magnificent job of bringing professional expertise to the modern soldier, but few have given ideas for individual survival. And as most of us have heard, if a new replacement can last one week in combat, he will probably survive many more.

I would like to offer here some good solid tips that either saved my life in combat or cost the life of someone around me when he neglected to follow them. Fortunately, I had read about and practiced many of these techniques before going to combat, and I am convinced that I wouldn't be here to write about them if I had not done so:

Learn how to shoot left-handed. If you are going around a corner in either direction, you can always have your weapon go before you. That split second will give you an advantage if the enemy sees you at the same time you see him. Furthermore, you can shoot with either hand while keeping your body behind an obstacle—a house, wall, or tree. (Naturally, if you're left-handed, learn how to shoot right-handed.)

Practice walking quietly. While trying to make a silent approach or on a night patrol, put the ball of your foot down first, or walk flat-footed. Normal walking with heels first will snap twigs, crunch gravel, and the like. A pair of socks pulled over your boots is even better. (Every company should have some extra large, heavy socks for night patrolling.)

When you go on a patrol, never return by the same route. Many a good man who slipped through an enemy outpost on the way into an area was ambushed coming out. By using another route, you can also cover more ground for surveillance. (Going through a path in a minefield is the exception to the rule, of course.) Be sure the men in your unit know you are out on patrol and from what area you will be returning. Green soldiers, in particular, are apt to be trigger-happy. Before going out, always check on your own minefields, claymores, and the like.

When attacking a room in a building, go in as low to the floor as possible. The enemy, especially if he's surprised, will usually fire chest high or higher. Never stand in a doorway blasting the interior with automatic fire.

Always be aware of the immediate terrain. Any little fold of ground, especially in a flat field or desert, may save your life during a mortar or artillery barrage. Practice getting on your stomach and melting into the ground. Even a slight dip will make you far less vulnerable.

When approaching a new area, put yourself in the place of the enemy. Ask yourself where you would hide if you were him; where you would set up your machineguns; what fields of fire you would sweep; where you would lay mines, zero in your artillery, cover with riflemen; and where the blind spots are.

Watch the old pros in a combat-wise outfit. Many rookies are not so much afraid of the enemy as they are afraid of looking "chicken." Accordingly, for fear of looking foolish, they won't hit the ground fast enough or crouch low enough.

Never walk on a ridgeline or the crest of a hill. Stay just below the crest so that you are not silhouetted for an enemy observer who might otherwise never see you. When going over a crest, try to find a saddle or a clump of trees.

When resting or waiting, stay in the shadows if possible. This will prevent observation or sudden strafing by an aircraft. Deep shadows make excellent temporary camouflage, especially for vehicles.

Use all your senses! Obviously, vision is most vital, but hearing is important as well, especially at night. Your nose, too, can be a lifesaver. On three different occasions I smelled hiding Germans, who had the distinctive odor of the cheese ra-

tion they ate. No matter what they eat, soldiers get pretty "ripe" after a few weeks without bathing, and you can also sniff for diesel fuel, cooking food, cigarettes, and various other things.

Do not use a house or a village as a fort. Either can turn out to be a death trap. The windows give poor fields of fire, and one hand grenade or rocket thrown in can wipe out the unit inside. Use houses for warming centers, command posts, or brief respites, but no more than 20 percent of your men should ever be in a house or village at one time. The others should be dug in around the buildings whether awake or asleep. Many a command has been wiped out because almost everyone was inside a structure with only a few men on guard outside. Even if your sentries outside give warnings, how can you get out, or fight properly? The worst day of your life will be the one you spend in a house with an enemy tank firing shells through the windows.

Learn to improvise. Every field manual gives solutions to situations in which a full complement of weapons and men is available. But after only a few days of fighting, key personnel will be dead or wounded, and you can't conceal an advance behind chemical smoke when you've used all your smoke. It's wonderful to rush into a house or a room after tossing in a grenade—if you have one left. When key men on a football team are injured, the second- and third-stringers can fill the gaps. But in a combat unit a missing member or piece of equipment may not be replaced for weeks, if at all.

When advancing, fire your weapon in the enemy's direction, even if you don't have a specific target. There are very few targets on the battlefield, but by keeping bullets or missiles cracking over the enemy's head, you can keep him down in his hole. Although this is the essence of fire superiority, some men go through a campaign and never fire their rifles. Individual riflemen must be taught to fire up a storm if the entire unit is to be aggressive and win. (It has been shown that crew-served weapons are fired more regularly than individual weapons. The idea of "fire teams" should be expanded.)

Always brief your men, showing them the objectives to be taken and letting them scan the immediate terrain, if possible. Too often in combat, men are given orders—"dig in here" or "saddle up, we're moving out"—without knowing the big picture. This can create a certain lethargy and sometimes chaos, especially at night. Uninformed soldiers, if separated from their unit or forced to take command because of casualties, cannot be fully effective.

Upon receiving my battlefield commission, I made it a point to gather all the

men around my map a small group at a time and show them our objectives, an overall picture of the area, and what the high command was trying to accomplish. When they learned that our small objective (possibly a village sitting astride an intersection of two roads) was vital to the success of the entire campaign, the men became more enthusiastic. Even some veteran sergeants who had fought from Africa to the Rhine said this was the first time they had been told what was going on.

When clearing a town of the enemy, stay out of the streets as much as possible. Go over back walls (very quickly), go through courtyards, even punch holes through walls if necessary, and use the rooftops. This is especially important in European-type villages where houses usually have common walls like row houses and are built flush to the street. Remember that frightened natives will lock their doors, so don't dash across a street expecting to throw open a door to escape from an enemy firing down the street. Vainly trying to break through a heavy locked door creates a firing squad atmosphere.

Practice these tips in training. Regardless of how many months of realistic combat training a man goes through, in the back of his mind he knows that there is a safety officer present, that explosives are set off in safety patterns, and that overhead fire is carefully monitored. This often breeds a certain nonchalance, or even bravado in training.

All of our lives, in fact, we are protected by warning labels, stop signs, barriers to keep us from falling into construction holes, and cautious mothers. Then when a man goes into combat and that first shell or bullet clips by, he suddenly realizes, "My God, they're trying to kill me!" Such a realization will age you very quickly—and when your first friend is killed or maimed you will suddenly age another ten years.

Regardless of how well you prepare yourself and your soldiers through training, few men are ready for this shock. The realism of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin is a help, but even there a soldier does not see disjointed bodies and screaming comrades.

Every individual soldier, and certainly every commander, must imagine how he will react; he must be prepared to continue functioning, coolly and efficiently, despite the mayhem, blood, and death around him. Calling for medics or wringing your hands does not win battles, but the ability to steel yourself and continue your mission will mold victories.

Learn to think like a hunter or an Indian scout, and survive!

David J. Daze is a retired infantry lieutenant, having received a battlefield commission in France in World War II. He served as a replacement rifleman, as a squad and platoon leader, and as an acting company commander, all in Company L, 30th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division.

The Mechanical Ambush

MAJOR WILLIAM A. JACOBS, JR.

With the recurrent interest in light infantry techniques, many of the lessons learned in Vietnam are also enjoying a comeback. One technique widely used then but almost forgotten since is the mechanical ambush. (See also "The Ambush" by Brigadier General Wayne A. Downing and Command Sergeant Major George D. Conrad, INFANTRY, January-February 1986, pp. 21-26.)

The term "mechanical ambush" was used to describe the employment of claymore mines in conjunction with an electrical firing circuit and various types of trigger devices to cover areas a unit could not otherwise cover with its organic weapons. A mechanical ambush was especially effective against an enemy who often moved in small numbers during periods of limited visibility, and who was usually thoroughly familiar with the local area.

Most platoon-sized elements emplaced one or two mechanical ambushes in areas accessible to their night defensive perimeter, usually in places where there was evidence of enemy passage or on routes of approach into the perimeter. The ambush was taken up after standto the following morning, and the materials used in its construction were saved and used again the next night.

The mechanical ambush seems to have been an invention of the soldiers in the field, who constructed it out of field expedient materials. Its emplacement and disarming was left to several trusted and proven individuals, normally platoon sergeants or squad leaders, because it was extremely dangerous. Accidents occurred frequently in units that did not have rigid SOPs for constructing and disarming the systems. Platoon leaders and company commanders personally supervised at least the employment of the ambushes, and their locations were reported to higher headquarters and coordinated as temporary minefields would have been. Most units had a favorite method of constructing a mechanical ambush, especially with the triggering device, and more than any other item in the Vietnam war, the mechanical ambush displayed our soldiers' ingenuity.

This type of ambush is still worthy of consideration today. It consists of three component parts—the triggering device, the claymore munitions, and the firing circuit (Figure 1). In constructing such an ambush, one must grasp the concept of an electrical firing circuit—once the circuit is closed through the use of the triggering device, the ambush explodes.

The claymore mines are emplaced and aimed with maximum effective ranges and range fans in mind. Since claymore fires are three dimensional, they can be emplaced in trees or high stream banks to fire downward with devastating effect. The claymores are then connected with detonating cord, and a non-electric blasting cap is crimped on each end of each length of cord; the cap is slipped into the fuze well of the claymore, and the entire group of mines "daisy-chained" together. Although there is theoretically no limit to the number of claymores that can be emplaced, the number actually used should be dictated by the configuration of the ambush site and by the idea that a mechanical ambush should be as simple as possible.

The firing circuit is constructed from the wire that is included in the kit for installing the claymore mine. This wire can be lengthened or shortened, depending on the needs of the moment, but it must be modified as shown in Figure 2.

Point A in the sketch is the electric blasting cap, which is inserted into the



Figure 1. A mechanical ambush consists of a triggering device, claymore munitions, and a firing circuit.



Figure 2. Firing circuit.

fuze well of the last claymore mine in the chain. Point B is simply a cut in the circuit into which the triggering device will be placed. The power source, normally a battery, will be placed at Point C. (The electric blasting cap requires only .9 volts to explode, and a PRC-77 battery can be used for this task. When it is, the receptacle end of the PRC-77 battery should be disassembled and the black and white wires cut and stripped to get the maximum voltage.)

The final component of a mechanical ambush—and the one that shows true GI ingenuity—is the firing device. The different types can be generally classified into four categories—standard pull, pull-release, pressure, and motion sensitive—all of them constructed of field expedient materials. Examples of the four categories are shown in Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6.



Figure 3. Firing devices in the "pull" category—the clothespin (left) and the mousetrap (right).



Figure 4. The slipwire, a pull-release device.



Figure 5. A pressure device.



Figure 6. The hanging wire, a motion sensitive device.

The slipwire device shown in Figure 4 is made of two pieces of standard 12-gauge plastic-covered electrical wire, the kind that can be found in household electrical cable. One wire is bent with a pair of needlenose pliers and then the other wire is bent around it. The plastic insulation should not be trimmed until a decision is made on how far the wire needs to slip before making contact. (This is my favorite, because it is compact and highly efficient. Against an enemy lacking mechanical skills in Vietnam, it was highly effective, because he could never decide how to disarm it.)

A pressure device (Figure 5) is the least recommended one because it is difficult to insulate and depends on an enemy soldier stepping directly on it. It can be constructed from two tin-can ends, partially punched with a beer can opener to make a few small spikes before they are removed from the can. These small spikes are kept apart by a leaf, which they will readily puncture if the device is stepped on, thereby making common contact. Another leaf can be used to camouflage the top of the device.

The hanging wire device (Figure 6) can be hung from a limb or placed in a bush that an enemy will have to brush out of the way to clear a trail. The motion of the limb will cause the pendulum to move, which will then make contact with the encircling ring. If the enemy has become wary of tripwires or has his eyes on the ground, this can be an effective triggering device. But anyone employing it must keep in mind that the wind can also trigger it.

A mechanical ambush must be installed and recovered sequentially to insure the safety of all involved. These instructions should be followed:

First, select the ambush site and plan the locations of the claymore mines, the triggering device, and the battery. See that the battery is hidden from the kill zone and that it can be reached without going through that zone. Install the mines, then the trigger device. Unroll the firing circuit, keeping all ends shunted

together, back to the location chosen for the battery.

After insuring that all personnel are out of the area, connect the trigger device and then place the blasting cap into the last claymore mine. Then follow the firing circuit wire back to the battery location, take cover, and connect the battery. Recover in reverse order. THE BATTERY MUST ALWAYS BE CONNECTED LAST AND RECOVERED FIRST.

It is a good idea to remain near the ambush to detect any tampering. Don't forget that the mechanical ambush cannot distinguish between friend and foe; make sure that the person who emplaced the device also recovers it, and that he uses landmarks to orient himself during the recovery process.

Anyone recovering a mechanical ambush must use extreme caution. If the ambush has been detected, there may be a counterambush or a booby trap waiting. And if the ambush has exploded, there may be wounded enemy soldiers to deal with.

The following are some combat tips that will increase the effectiveness of a mechanical ambush:

- Waterproof the trigger device if possible with a small plastic bag. Tape all bare wires and use a PRC-77 battery bag to waterproof the power source.
- Camouflage all components of the ambush well. Instead of using issue tripwire, use a small, strong vine and arrange it so that it appears to be random growth.
- A tripwire with some slack in it is preferable to a taut one, especially when fighting an enemy who is likely to be barelegged and therefore sensitive to it. Vary the height of tripwires, but remember that generally a slack tripwire at knee level is less likely to be detected.
- Augment the effectiveness of the claymore mines by hanging a white phosphorus grenade on the front of the mine; don't forget to camouflage the grenade.
- Aim all claymore mines and make sure their fires are overlapping. It is generally better to aim low and use the effect of rocks and dirt to inflict further casualties.

Soldiers should be allowed to use their imagination, but strict control and safe handling of the component parts of a mechanical ambush are essential.

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Moving to An Alternate CP

CAPTAIN ROBIN P. SWAN

A tactical operations center (TOC), because of its role as a task force's command, control, communications and intelligence center, is a major source of electromagnetic and infrared energy, and this makes it an easy target for the enemy to locate and highly susceptible to attack by indirect fire. Units have developed many techniques for reducing the likelihood of enemy attack, such as moving the TOC frequently, using camouflage, remoting radio platforms, and masking the antennas.

If a TOC is attacked, however, and rendered incapable of performing its mission, the task force administration/logistic center (ALC) must quickly assume the functions of the TOC and help the task force commander with the command and control of the current operation. The complexity of this task can be reduced considerably if TOC and ALC personnel have been trained in the actions they must take in the event the TOC is attacked.

GUIDE

The following procedural guide for meeting such a situation was developed by the 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry, and practiced during several training exercises. Other units may find it a starting point from which to prepare their own guides that conform to their standing operating procedures.

Step 1. The TOC is neutralized. Survivors assess the damage and treat the casualties. A surviving radio platform (if available) is used to pass operational control to the ALC. (This report includes a damage and casualty assessment.) The ALC assumes TOC duties and responds to radio calls using the TOC call sign.

Step 2. The ALC assumes control of operations and switches radio frequencies in the ALC M577 to operate in the brigade operations/intelligence (O/I), task force command, and task force administration/logistics (A/L) FM radio nets. ALC personnel monitor the brigade command and brigade A/L nets from the S-4's HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) or M151. The ALC informs the brigade net control station (NCS) that the TOC has been neutralized.

Step 3. The ALC dispatches a medical evacuation vehicle to the TOC site. TOC survivors continue treating casualties. The senior TOC survivor takes

charge and designates which survivors will shift to the ALC.

Step 4. TOC survivors take the following actions before leaving the TOC site:

- Secure KYK-13, KYK-15, DMD, CEOIs, and RC-292 antennas.
- Zero all KYK-57 devices and switch radio frequencies on battle damaged M577 command post vehicles.
- Burn VFMED tapes and destroy remaining VFMED elements if the fire support element (FSE) M577 is damaged or destroyed.
- Secure operations map, intelligence overlays, and fire support overlays.
- Load casualties, equipment, and survivors on any vehicles that are left. Establish a casualty collection point for the wounded who cannot be loaded on the surviving vehicles. The most seriously wounded soldiers are evacuated first.
- Destroy remaining equipment.

Step 5. TOC survivors move to the ALC. Immediately upon their arrival, casualties are taken to the task force aid station. The task force executive officer (XO) (or the task force S-4 if the XO is not available) supervises the ALC's transition to the TOC. He directs the following actions:

- The surviving TOC personnel are updated on the current situation by the ALC shift NCO in charge. Information displays are moved into the ALC, and operations, intelligence, and fire support information is updated.
- Radio platforms in the ALC M577 are reconfigured to operate in the task force command, brigade O/I, and division air defense early warning nets. The brigade command and fire direction nets are monitored from the task force XO's HMMWV or M151. The task force command and A/L nets are monitored from the task force S-4's HMMWV or M151. The brigade A/L net is monitored from the task force radio-teletypewriter located in the combat trains.
- The senior TOC survivor submits a detailed loss report to the task force S-1 and S-4.

Step 6. The TOC and ALC prepare to move if required to do so. Movement configurations are dependent upon the number of surviving vehicles from the TOC. When the TOC moves, the task force S-4 remains as officer in charge of the task force combat trains and operates the ALC from his HMMWV or M151.

By constantly practicing proper TOC procedures, a unit may eliminate the need for a guide such as this. But the speed with which soldiers can perform the above steps in the event of TOC neutralization may make the difference between the success and the failure of the current operation. TOC and ALC personnel should therefore be trained to perform these steps and to perform them under differing visibility and NBC conditions.

Captain Robin P. Swan is aide to the commanding general, 2d Armored Division. He formerly served as S-3 and rifle company commander in the 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry. He has also served as plans and exercise officer in the G-3 section of the 2d Armored Division (Forward) in Germany. He is a 1978 ROTC graduate of Indiana University of Pennsylvania.

Squad Competitions

CAPTAIN KENT W. EISELE

Squad competitions are an effective way to motivate soldiers to do their best. They instill a winning spirit in soldiers, challenge squad leaders, build cohesion, and raise overall unit readiness. Commanders can use squad competitions in virtually all aspects of training. For the best results, however, this kind of training must be planned and conducted carefully.

Platoon leaders and company commanders may find the following advice helpful:

Maintain minimum individual standards. Do not forget that competitions should raise the standards of both the squad and the individual soldier above the set minimum. Do not allow a strong squad to compensate for a soldier who does not meet the minimum standard, but see that the other members train him to the standard.

An effective technique is to include in the rules the stipulation that one "no-go" will knock the entire squad out of a competition. A soldier who fails to qualify with his weapon, for example, will disqualify his squad for a marksmanship competition even if the squad has the highest average score. Knowing that the squad members pass or fail together encourages the stronger soldiers to help train the weaker ones.

Give the squad leaders an opportunity to train their own squads. If you hold your squad leaders accountable for the training of their squads through the use of squad competitions, then you must give those same squad leaders a chance to train their squads themselves. For example, if a squad physical training competition is to be effective, the squad

leader must be able to conduct his squad's PT. If all physical training is run at company level by the first sergeant, any squad competition will be detrimental, since the squad leaders will be evaluated on training given by someone else.

Do not allow stacked squads. The desire to win may tempt some platoon leaders and platoon sergeants to tailor their squads differently for each competition, but this should not be allowed. Machinegun teams and radio-telephone operators should be attached to the same squads for each competition.

Keep evaluations and competitions as objective as possible. Ensure that all the squad leaders know what the minimum standards are, what will disqualify their squads, and exactly how the winning squad will be chosen. Some evaluations, such as squad ARTEPs, naturally involve subjective judgements, but make every effort to reduce subjectivity as much as possible. For example, during squad ARTEPs, have one evaluator watch all the squads conduct a defense, another evaluator watch all squads conduct an ambush, and so on, instead of having different evaluators grade the same task for different squads.

Try to pick a winner without picking losers. Obviously, the best squad is the winner, but if all the squads can attain your established minimum standards, there need not be any losers. Impress this fact on your squad leaders.

Try to "spread the wealth." Squad competitions can be a double-edged sword. If the same squad wins every competition, the rest of the company may give up trying. Evaluations must be objective and fair. Make competitions diverse enough that each squad can compete in its own area of strength. Ideally, the ultimate goal is to have a different squad win each competition, giving each squad "bragging rights" in specific areas.

Establish suitable rewards for winning. There must be an incentive for the squads to do well, because all squad competitions by nature are evaluations. Squad leaders will realize this fact and put more effort into their squads' training, since their squads' performance is generally a reflection of their own leadership. Rewards should extend down to the individual level and should include the entire squad. Make sure the soldiers understand that their rewards are primarily for their unit cohesion. Possible rewards include battalion certificates of achievement, letters of commendation, trophies, passes, exemptions from the duty roster, and public recognition. Publish in advance the rewards the winning squad will receive.

Consider posting scores publicly. Whether or not to publicize a competition's results depends upon the competition. For example, post PT scores, which are public knowledge, but not SQT scores, which are confidential. Be careful when posting scores because there is great potential for embarrassing both soldiers and leaders.

Form an "old man" squad. When applicable, combine the commander, executive officer, first sergeant, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants into an "old man" squad. Your soldiers will enjoy competing directly with the company's leaders, as they rarely get a chance to do so.

Do not get carried away. If you conduct too many squad competitions, they will lose their effectiveness. They can develop squad cohesion but destroy platoon and company cohesion. There is a fine line between healthy competition conducted periodically and unhealthy pressure from incessant evaluations.

Squad competitions can be effective in virtually all types of training. The following are some suggestions with criteria for winners:

- Physical training—Highest average APFT scores.
- M16 marksmanship—Highest average qualification score.
- NBC—Highest score on individual and team tasks.
- Squad ARTEP—Highest score.
- Soldier knowledge—General orders, code of conduct, and so on.
- Athletics—Company organization day olympics.
- Combined marksmanship—Highest combined score on Bradley gunnery, M60, .45 caliber, M203, and SAW.
- Road march—First squad in with all soldiers.

Squad competitions offer many posi-

tive benefits. They raise soldiers to their highest levels of performance; in a competition, merely meeting the Army standard will not ensure winning. Instead, a competition pushes each soldier to his limit in support of his squad's overall effort. In this way, a squad competition builds squad unit cohesion since all members strive toward the group goal of winning.

Competitions cause squad leaders to get totally involved in their squads' training, which raises the readiness of the entire unit. Most important, squad competitions develop in soldiers the aggressive winning spirit that is essential in combat, and combat is the ultimate competition.

Captain Kent W. Eisele recently completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and is now attending graduate school in preparation for an instructor assignment at the United States Military Academy. He has commanded a light infantry company. He is a 1981 graduate of the United States Military Academy.

Traveling Overwatch

LIEUTENANT MICHAEL FIACCO

The tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army states that there are three types of platoon movement techniques—traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. The traveling technique is used when speed of movement is desired and contact with the enemy is not likely. The traveling overwatch technique is used when contact with the enemy is possible. The bounding overwatch is used when contact with the enemy is expected, or when the platoon is crossing a danger area. The most commonly used—and abused—of the three is the traveling overwatch.

Often when an infantry platoon is using the traveling technique in moving through wooded or thick vegetation or rough terrain, the platoon leader feels he cannot sufficiently control the movement and also maintain the proper interval between the lead squad and the main body of the platoon. He therefore shortens the interval between the two elements, changing from traveling overwatch to the traveling technique. By doing this, however, he sacrifices security for control. During a chance contact with the enemy, the main body is now far more likely to be initially engaged, and this will limit its freedom to maneuver.

The purpose of the traveling overwatch is to make contact with the enemy with only the lead squad being decisively engaged. This requires an interval of at least 50 to 100 meters between the lead squad and the main body of the platoon, and an even greater interval in open terrain. This interval allows the main body of the platoon to maneuver

and flank the enemy with maximum firepower upon contact.

By observing the proper interval during movement, the platoon also increases its security by maintaining its freedom to maneuver. Control during movement is maintained through proper planning, navigational techniques, and the use of halts.

During planning for the movement, the navigator for each of the platoon elements must make sure his route is exactly the same as that of his counterparts. Azimuths, distances, terrain features, rally points, and route checkpoints must all be planned for and known by each navigator. Aids such as navigation sheets could be helpful, and duplicate sheets could be used for the guidance of both the lead squad and the main body of the platoon. (See Swap Shop item on navigation sheets by Captain Karl A. Miller in INFANTRY, November-December 1986, page 11.)

The use of halts during movement is important in keeping the lead squad and the main body from losing sight of each other. If halts are scheduled every 300 to 500 meters, depending upon the terrain, movement can be easily controlled. These halts may be pre-designated at rally points, route checkpoints, or listening halts.

Halts can also be used when the lead squad encounters a danger area or an obstacle that may require a change of route. At these halts the lead squad stops and waits for the main body to approach close enough to pass hand and arm signals. Danger areas, rally points, the signal to rally key leaders, and the like, are communicated between the elements. Any route changes or actions to be taken by the platoon should be discussed here.

When the lead squad makes contact with the enemy, the squad leader must immediately contact his platoon leader and pass on the information he has. Within the platoon, SOPs should be established for the use of radio, runners, whistles, or other means of communication to relay that information. In the absence of communication, the platoon leader must react to the sound of the battle in maneuvering his platoon.

Proper use of the traveling overwatch technique comes with practice and use. Security and control can be maintained even when moving through woods or thick vegetation, but only if platoon leaders know their jobs, are tactically proficient, and have properly trained their subordinate leaders.

Lieutenant Michael Fiacco is assigned to Company B, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, where he has served as a platoon leader and company executive officer.

SWAP SHOP

FLASHBULB CLAYMORE

Claymore mines rarely get the attention they should in a training environment, because they do not exhibit any real effects. Often in a training exercise, opposing force soldiers will walk through a mechanical ambush that has been set, but nobody (including the controllers) notices the claymores were there.

But there is a way to set up a claymore that will give off a visual signal and allow soldiers to feel as if they have set up the real thing. This is known as a flashbulb claymore.

Before a flashbulb claymore can be put into operation, several modifications must be made to the live claymore residue wire:

- Obtain live claymore residue wire from any ASI or ASP. (Don't use the inert wire with an inert blasting cap, but save it for its intended training purpose, which is to give soldiers feedback on installing, disarming, and recovering claymores.)
- Unroll the residue firing wire.
- Separate the end of the firing wire until there is six inches of separated wire.
- Remove about one inch of insulation from both pieces of wire and attach an alligator clip to each bare wire.

Once the fourth step has been completed, the flashbulb claymore is ready to be put into operation. To do this, first perform all the performance measures outlined in the Soldier's Manual. (NOTE: To use the test set, make sure both alligator clips are clipped together to complete the circuit.) Stop at the step that involves inserting the blasting cap into one of the detonating wells. Instead, run the wire through both shipping plugs and tape a flashbulb to the top of the claymore. Then connect both alligator clips to the flashbulb. (NOTE: Do not let the alligator clips touch each other.)

To detonate, just squeeze the M57 firing device and there will be a flash of bright light that simulates a blast from a claymore. *(EDITOR'S NOTE: See also the article "Ammunition: Dummy, Inert, and Simulated," by Captain Derek A.N. Soriano, INFANTRY, November-December 1987, page 11.)*



(Submitted by Lieutenant Steven A. Shelby, Company A, 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, Fort Ord, California.)

PAST TIMES

EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is reprinted from the May-June 1970 issue of INFANTRY (pages 6-12). Charles Black was, at the time, associate editor and military reporter for the Columbus *(Georgia)* Enquirer.

As a noncommissioned officer with the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions in World War II and Korea, he had earned the Silver Star, Bronze Star for Valor, and Air Medal. Up to 1970 he had made five trips to Vietnam, participating in more than 100 combat missions. Now deceased, he was known (in the Fort Benning area, at least) as the Ernie Pyle of the Vietnam War.

14 PROVERBS
Gleaned from a Damp Foxhole

CHARLES BLACK

My proudest contributions to military thinking are listed in the following proverbs, rules, and quotations:

1. All military doctrine is intended for level, paved roads on pleasant June days. Other situations demand field expedients.

I define field expedients as the successful use of what is available—properly mixed with good judgment and imagination—to solve a problem. And a sense of humor doesn't hurt, come to think of it, because of the irony that no good field expedient violates doctrine, but simply applies it to the real world situation.

It isn't a good field expedient, by my rules, to dig in an operational tank as a pillbox for a defense perimeter. That violates all the rules—mobility, economy of force, offense, you name them, all of those rules which good field expedients are based on.

But at the Special Forces camp at Duc Co, since at least 1965 when I first saw it, there is a T41 tank dug in on the southwest corner of the perimeter, and I think it is one of the finest field expedients I've ever seen. It had been shot to pieces and left lying around for bird nests and mud daubers during the wild old days in late summer of 1965 when the camp was relieved from 60 days of siege.

Somehow the A Team hauled that junk inside, hammered and banged until they had an operable turret and coaxial gun, and dug it in. They successfully defended against later salvage attempts. These attempts would have simply transferred the unsalvable item to some military junkyard on the coast. This made it a proper field expedient by my book. It met a better fate at the hands of the scrounging A Team and one any book would approve of if it were read properly.

Field expedients, when imaginatively exploited at all levels, are not necessarily the bane of the higher command, either. A higher command which views them in line with Proverb 12 (don't look ahead, damn it, we'll get to it in proper order) will always find value in the untidy miracles wrought by the lower echelon's use of baling wire and green tape.

In 1968 in Israel, to illustrate that last pithy bit, I watched a correspondent of my acquaintance stalking a story, and when dealing with the Israelis this is a good bit like sneaking up on a butterfly through a field of briars and snakes and snagging him lefthanded with a pair of chopsticks.

He had a question: "If along the Suez Canal the Egyptians are dropping in 122mm and 130mm artillery on Israeli positions, why are Israeli casualties no higher?"

He asked that question, as correspondents do, in every possible manner and of every possible person except the one who could possibly answer it—the PIO (public information officer) at the Tel Aviv military headquarters.

Finally he was driven even to that, and he did, and he got an answer: "As you know, it would require a meter-and-a-half of reinforced concrete to withstand a direct hit from such heavy artillery. Building such a formidable line in a remote area would be terribly expensive. Our technicians, therefore, found a different material. They were able to solve this problem, in fact, by sending a minimum of supplies not available directly on the scene and by coming up with equipment which can be used by any soldier without prior training. It can even be used for other purposes and simply left in the forward positions when its original purpose is done. This has proved adequate and economical. It performs the same job as expensive concrete or other such materials and we intend to expand its application as feasible and necessary. Due to problems of security, of course, it is impossible to go into detail concerning the equipment or the material itself."

I've never seen a correspondent more delighted. His story was played around the world under headlines saying "Israelis Develop Secret Material for Fortifications," and the like.

The public information officer involved did, in fact, have stringent security requirements to meet. He also had a story which he felt made his Army look very good and which he wanted to get into the world press. So he solved this staff prob-

lem of making the best use of a field expedient by falling back on inspired use of field expedient, or possibly office expedient. He accomplished all of his objectives.

And, in the course of it, he neatly sandbagged a particularly pesky correspondent who had been bothering people about it for weeks. (Oh, yes, you're the slow one, aren't you? Should I have underlined "sandbagged"?)

2. No other military equipment has the perfection of a C-ration can opener.

All right, this article is the very best example I can give to that dictum. It was originally printed in a daily column I write which is limited to about 750 words of the simplest possible category because of what I believe to be short-sighted editorial judgment on the part of my immediate superior.

The extremely gifted and perceptive management here at INFANTRY, on the other hand, requested me "to expand the column somewhat and explore the 13 contributions to military thinking in greater depth."

To illustrate the meaning of Proverb 2, let me expand on the obvious implications already apparent by adding that there are now 14 contributions to military thinking, one of which I stole from Frederick the Great.

3. Men can go anywhere despite anything, except opposition by better men willing to go anywhere despite anything. Terrain, hostile weather, firepower, etc., can punish and delay men determined to pass, but never stop them.

I suppose we could start with Hannibal and the elephants, take it through PFC Awol Jones and the hole in the fence to as far as the lunar landing, and make the point equally well.

But my thoughts on this matter center on Ashau Valley.

In 1966 and 1967 I was told that B-52s were arc lighting that particular terrain, interdicting the supply route for the North Vietnamese. Some wild jakanape in a Bird Dog lured me into flying up there in March of 1967 and despite all the streaks on the negatives caused by 12.7mm tracer tracks and the way my sweaty palms leaked through the camera case, it was pretty damned obvious that interdiction by conventional bombing is not a perfected art where primitive terrain is involved.

The NVA had four trucks parked in the middle of the abandoned Special Forces camp, just for openers, and what looked like a 25-mile freeway right down the middle of the valley coming out of Laos.

I made a fascinating study of the effect of 750-pound bombs landing on that dirt road (my mind was deeply engrossed in the subject of holes at the moment) which showed me that:

- A big bomb makes a big deep hole.
- It removes the brush for several meters around the hole.
- It throws up a lot of loose dirt.

This information, valuable as it was, was enhanced by illustration of what is necessary to bypass a 750-pound bomb crater in a dirt road:

- Remove the brush for several meters around the hole.
- Have a lot of loose dirt handy to firm up a new track.

I further found that to get a handy storage place for fuel resupply, spare parts, candy, rice wine, etc., one needs:

- A big deep hole.

Back in the various dens of cooler heads in Da Nang, after my initial gibbering had subsided and a facial tic was anesthetized with a soothing balm, I got the final answer. "Well, if it's so, it's so. But you can't operate in the Ashau Valley. The weather . . . monsoons . . . 30 days flying weather each year . . . terrain . . . proximity to sanctuary . . ."

All of which, in my personal opinion, provided at least one route which the enemy followed to Hue in Tet of 1968.

After Tet, Major General John J. Tolson operated his 1st Air Cavalry Division for 28 days in Ashau. After that the 101st Airborne Division went in and operated in Ashau Valley. And after that, of course, we fell back on interdicting it with B-52 arc lights which made it impossible for the enemy to use it—except to drive trucks full of supplies through. And guess what the next answer will be.

Now, consider the case of PFC Awol Jones and the hole in the fence . . .

4. Night belongs to him who claims it. It is a friend to weak armies because strong armies are usually lazy.

If I felt a demand to expand on that, add depth and scholarship, I would add that strong armies also usually have better clubs and entertainment facilities than weak armies and therefore have better things to do with their nights than crawl around out in the wet brush. This leads directly to:

5. Given a 15-minute break, an Eskimo army will build air conditioned igloos, Indian soldiers a Taj Mahal, Americans field model pentagons. Unchecked, any army prefers building and scrounging for material to any other activity.

Let us be discreet and fly at a polite altitude over the WAC quarters at Long Binh, the swimming pool at Cu Chi, the hockey equipment being slingloaded toward some mysterious



enterprise of the 1st Cavalry, to the spartan surroundings of Vung Tau. Down there one day I saw the classic example of adding the final touch to the final touch as far as building and scrounging are concerned.

Quite proudly, an aviation battalion had at long last achieved a piped-in supply of potable water. There was an immediate critical shortage of sign material, however, so that the sinks, showers, coolers, et al, could be properly labeled.

As I recall, I landed at the headquarters in a Huey filled with ammunition boxes scrounged from an artillery unit at Bear Cat which was in need of a watertight engine crate for showers.

The battalion commander was rightfully wroth at this expenditure of flying time and refused permission to slingload back the return barter material. (He earned my admiration for being a master at proper timing during my stay with him, incidentally.)

Pilots are an honorable lot when it pays, and liaison with a properly situated artillery battalion can pay well in the scrounging game. They therefore noted the regularity of Air Force courier flights to Bear Cat and they simply addressed the engine crate to the unit they owed it to and put it on the Air Force's desk.

Now the Air Force is involved in wars within wars, and one of these wars is the war of impressive statistics. Few statistics slam home with the authority of ton miles of cargo. Few things can mess up a statistical assault of that kind quite so much as a big-volume, low-weight engine case. They turned it down flat.

The Army aviators were not to be deterred by cost effectiveness jockeys, however. They reasoned that if the cannon cockers would be happy with an engine crate, think how much happier they would be with a nicely sanded patio to go with the shower. They filled the crate with a high grade of Vung Tau sand.

Cost effective? That was a big, heavy, cost effective brute. The Air Force statisticians entered competitive bids to fly the thing in their birds.

All was well. Men labored and turned the ammunition crates into signs saying "Potable." They even found a use for the existing signs saying "Non-potable," as I recall, by carefully mounting them over the appropriate plumbing facilities. Nothing was left to chance at Vung Tau.

Scrounging can become a fascinating game unto itself and building it as soldierly an instinct as is outwitting the Air Force, and don't anyone ever forget it. But it can cost a lot if it gets out of hand.

6. Infantrymen can live through many battles with only average luck if they have keen curiosity about what the enemy does and why he does it.

We all know that. Why is it safer to chase a Viet Cong wearing a pack than one all nicely stripped down to basic black and AK-47? Why are you suspicious if the 0430 mist along the Cambodian border is heavy with the scent of charcoal smoke? Why are streams in the highlands such a lure for the NVA? (Answers: A Viet Cong without his home on his back has his home and friends nearby. NVA eat, and to eat they cook, and to cook they make fires. NVA drink water, too.) See how subtly invigorating the subject is when you delve into it?

If you really take an interest in the enemy, you aren't so surprised when he does things which are perfectly natural for him to do and you will have an edge on him, which is enough.

7. Scouts have an implied warranty that quick and effective use will be made of information. Scouts too often are used simply to satisfy staff curiosity or to fuel operation center debate.

Good scouts are turned into bad scouts by not delivering to them as many tangible, concrete results for their efforts as you can. Once the change occurs, in my own experience, it seems to be a permanent one and the scouts involved never

quite get back into their old stride. Assignments to scouts should always be either truly important or come from a curious staff which needs fuel for debate or which can also come up with an ironclad snow job that convinces the scouts that what they are doing is important.

8. A small unit in violent contact gives a commander with helicopters only two choices, both immediate and with no excuse for delaying the decision. He can pile onto the fight or accept possible sacrifice of the platoon. Extraction by helicopter under fire is not an option; it should be excusable only if it happens by accident or in special operations.

I am adamant on this and must be excused if your remarkably logical objections simply infuriate me. When you have helicopters, any outfit not in contact is a reserve and available when they can get to a pickup zone. You went out there hunting a fight to start with and if you have one which is a real gut buster, you have achieved that much of the objective right there. Sending in empty helicopters to extract implies that one can send in helicopters with troops on board to exploit the contact or to reinforce the situation and help the men in trouble. Waiting around to make up your mind to the perfect solution will guarantee that you'll suddenly notice it is 1700 hours and don't you just love that time of day?

In March of 1966 near Chu Pong Mountain, a Blue platoon from the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry set out to investigate a scout pilot's report of seeing 30 North Vietnamese in the open. (Please see sub-proverb edition of this work which includes this statement: Hear 300 Americans in brush, really 30 Americans in open. See 30 North Vietnamese in open, really 300 in brush.)

All hell broke loose in the elephant grass. Brave helicopter pilots went in to get the Blues out of trouble and two of those birds were shot down immediately and the situation compounded.

All of this took place on the very edge of the AO, with ar-

tillery and the main troop effort way out of all but hollering distance. The brigade commander grabbed Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, and put them into the area like a man on a handball court suddenly seeing two balls come at him, but playing with both hands—anyway.

There was still trouble in the operation, but the company recovered the aircraft survivors and backed off into a perimeter. The brigade commander didn't want a contact down there—the Blues involved had just had bad scout luck—but he had done the proper thing quickly and reinforced. With no artillery and his hands full to the north, he tried an extraction of the reinforced unit.

No go. A big Chinook mingled in the operation to suck up the LZ in a hurry, got hit from one end to the other, and fell into the LZ and spoiled it for efficient helicopter operations.

The brigade CO had not assumed that any of this would work, anyway. He had found another LZ, scouted it, and had an artillery battery slingloading into it from its original location. As always, dusk was coming on. There were high stumps in the LZ. The commander of the 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion then went down with his landing lights on. (He dearly loved daring stumps with his helicopter. His crew chief maintained that this hobby was rivaled only by his sportsman's reflex at seeing a flying bird.) Four engineers assaulted with chain saws. A battery of artillery was lifted into place in the dark. ARA was in a solid orbit around the company by now and although nobody was out peddling life insurance at the LZ, things were better.

The whole orchestration was going within less time, really, than I have seen men ponder that original demand to reinforce or take the risk. At dawn, the brigade commander had a triangle of artillery in place, another full battalion on the ground and in pursuit of the enemy, and by that evening had a major and successful operation under way with contact being fully exploited. (He had some luck up north, let me admit, and could get the men and machines loose to do this, but he also had help come from division with reinforcements while he was making this switch to exploit a contact. It has to work all the way up the chain sometimes.)

I deliberately picked that one because on the surface it seemed to violate my maxim of no extraction—but not really. When the Blues first went in it was a special operation and the attempt to pull them out was part of the game. It was costly, but in my experience, almost any extraction which goes wrong is more costly than an assault under similar conditions.

When the special operation by the reconnaissance elements got out of control, the commander didn't just send more helicopters, he sent more men, and only then did he try to get his people out so he could sort out the situation. I've studied an interrogation of an officer captured from the 18th NVA Regiment, the enemy unit involved, and he said the staff had bitterly opposed his commander's orders to try to push in on an American rifle company in an all-around perimeter. In a way, since all indications at the time of the final extraction attempt were that the enemy had broken contact and headed for cover, the hot pickup zone was an accident—including the commander of the NVA going against his staff's advice.

When that one went haywire, the brigade commander had the process under way to do what he wanted to in the beginning, except for not having the resources to do it with. He'd argued himself some more muscle from higher and he was getting ready to send forces over to pick up the new fight. He simply said go when it was obvious that go had to be said.

9. Complicated plans become simple later from necessity. Start them that way.

Take this endeavor right here . . .

10. Every 30 minutes, remember this from Major General designee Hal Moore: ". . . ask yourself what you aren't doing that you should, and what you are doing that you shouldn't."

Hal Moore said that when he was a lieutenant colonel commanding the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, at the foot of Chu Pong Mountain during the battle at LZ X-Ray in November of 1965.

You noticed this is just 1970, did you? That's why I said remember it.

11. The best trick is to help the enemy believe he sees what he wants to see.

You hear so much about old tricks because they work. Don't amaze the enemy, he stampedes and becomes unpredictable and will confuse you. Diversions should always be just like things you've done before for real. Save new tricks for the best possible occasion or they won't be new any more. (They never work that well anyway.) Don't make a diversion so complicated it flabbergasts the enemy, as he might do the last thing you want and use his common sense.



I'm not responsible, really, for this one. I went over to the 2d Infantry Division in Korea to take the Imjin waters in the summer of 1968 and spent some time with the real exponent of those things. Brigadier General William (Ray) Lynch, who can explain any tactics by use of a hammer and an anvil and a pair of ice tongs. He could take the campaign of Archangel Michael and use those three visual education devices to explain exactly how it had been done. Lynch has taught me more about complicated matters with 15 words of common sense explanation than almost any tactician I've ever encountered.

In his pocket or in his quarters, you'll always find a dog-

eared old paperback Western story in which an old Indian fighter explains to a young Indian fighter about why old Indian fighting tricks are still useful. He let me take it up to a bunker and read it one night instead of contemplating the miracles of diplomacy. But the fellow who wrote that book had to have had a little of old Cactus Pete Clausewitz in his makeup.

Just take that number 11 as it is and make up something of your own to add to it. That's straight talk on how to be crooked, pardner.

12. Adversities are simply a new, normal situation. See them in this light and find an advantage.

One time at Ban Me Thuot in 1965 I agreed to go out for a little sport with some irregulars who took their irregularity seriously. This particular collection of Montagnards had all the efficient organization of a Gypsy argument when we lined up to get on the Hueys. It was a typical day in that it got hotter while we waited and eddied, and the lift factor went down.

Then came the long-awaited word from higher and This Was It. We rushed up to those helicopters, chickens, ducks, iron kettles, and me carrying a two-suiter suitcase.

Crew chiefs stood in the door and in concise, easily understood English explained to men who spoke concise, easily understood Rhade that one man would have to get off. At each helicopter there seemed to be one individual who wanted to



give the crew chief a bad time. There was a lot of arm waving and fluent exchange of diverse languages.

What would you do if you were a crew chief and you had to pick one guy to get off the helicopter? The wise guy, right? Right.

Have you ever landed with a Montagnard company in which every platoon leader and every squad leader had been kicked off the helicopters for arguing with the crew chiefs? You haven't? Deep in the jungle and a guaranteed six days of patrolling before you can even get on a log bird and extract? Carrying a two-suiter suitcase?

The fellows in the green berets taught me this proverb, first. They all assured me it was exactly what they'd been waiting for, a chance to try out some talent they'd spotted down in the ranks and possibly to prove what they'd been trying to tell the Dai Ui for six months, that the wrong chiefs were in charge. I listened and I saw then the magic of finding advantage in adversity, for them.

We walked one day and ate strange things that night and then we had mortars for dessert and things that went bump. We walked the next day and "sporadic contact" was the term used, I believe. I'd have cheerfully laid down and lived out of my two-suiter for the rest of the war except for sporadic contact giving me a certain hint about the temper of the neighbors.

We walked most of that night because we were behind schedule on some subtle military mission too complex to divulge to me and the rest of the Rhade back there. The next day it was different, because the enemy substituted sporadic mortar fire for sporadic contact and saved sporadic contact for around what the advisors maintained was a night defense perimeter but which I believed was a Rhade tribal ceremony.

The next day I suffered heat exhaustion, just collapsed, out of my head. They mournfully bade me farewell as they loaded me on a medevac and all the way back to Nha Trang I lay there sick, cramping, trembling, loving that heat exhaustion as if it were really a solid gold cadillac. You take my word for it, you can find an advantage.

13. A plan which works exactly right must be relentlessly investigated.

Either it was planned by men too timid for responsibility or too talented for the job. More likely, somebody is covering up valuable errors and denying others the benefit of experience. Perfect operations are boobytraps. Something HAD to go wrong and if you didn't hear about it then it probably was important. They would tell you about small matters.

That is self-explanatory, even for the purposes of answering to the demands of going into greater depth on a subject where I'd already reached the abyss in 750 words.

But to illustrate, although this is obviously an absolutely perfect article based on a request to write about my 13 proverbs, you will next read:

14. There are only four kinds of officers: The clever and energetic who make admirable staff officers. The clever and lazy who make magnificent generals. The stupid and lazy who can be used to grand effect by staff officers and generals. The stupid and energetic who must be executed at the first possible moment in order to check the breed.

I swiped that one from Frederick the Great, but I believe he swiped it from a clever and energetic staff officer. If you will consider . . . well, the last classification. And what do you suppose that implies about somebody laboring away on point 14 in a 13-point assignment?



ENLISTED CAREER NOTES

AIRBORNE VOLUNTEERS

There is a shortage of airborne-qualified staff sergeants and sergeants first class holding MOSs 11B and 11H in the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. Accordingly, a screen of soldiers who may be interested in applying for airborne training and assignment to the 82d Division has been completed, and a program to train and assign soldiers who volunteer has been put in place.

Participation is strictly voluntary, and volunteers must meet all of the prerequisites for selection.

For information regarding selection and assignment of airborne soldiers, anyone who is interested should contact his unit Personnel and Administration Center (PAC) and ask to see AR 614-200, Section II.

Soldiers overseas who are airborne qualified and have not received assignment instructions should contact their career advisors at the Infantry Assignment Branch, TAPA.

11M ASSIGNMENTS

As the Bradley fielding program continues, an increasing number of 11B infantrymen are being converted to 11M Bradley infantrymen. When a soldier converts to 11M, his assignment future probably changes drastically, and he needs to submit a new Enlisted Preference Statement (DA Form 2635) to indicate locations where he can reasonably expect to be assigned.

The locations that have a need for 11Ms in sufficient number are Germany; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Hood, Texas; and Fort Stewart, Georgia; with a limited number also at Fort Irwin, California.

Other installations or locations are also possible, of course, when an 11M is performing special duties such as drill sergeant or recruiter.

TELEPHONE DIRECTORY
INFANTRY ASSIGNMENT BRANCH, TAPA

	AUTOVON
Chief, Infantry/Armor Branch LTC Cardell S. Hunter	221-8055
Sergeant Major, Infantry/Armor Branch SGM David H. Snyder	221-8055
Senior Infantry Career Advisor SFC Ronnie E. Baker	221-8056
Career Advisor, SFC(P) through MSG SFC Larry Gensler	221-8056
Career Advisor, SSG(P) through SFC (MOS 11B/11M) SFC Ralph Hartke	221-8056
Career Advisor, SP4/CPL(P) through SSG (MOS 11B/11M) SFC Edmund Crivello	221-9399
Career Advisor, PVT through SP4 (CMF 11); SGT through SFC (MOS 11C/11H) SFC Harold Waldroup	221-8056 or 221-9543
Advance NCO Course Advisor SFC Clifford Adams	221-9166
Reclassification NCO SFC Michael D. Portman	221-9458

A soldier's new preference statement should express any desires he may have for schooling, especially schooling he would like to attend enroute to his next assignment. DA Pamphlet 351-4, The Army Formal Schools Catalog, has a complete listing of available courses and their prerequisites.

Once again, realistic requests have a better chance of succeeding. The schools that are most likely to be approved are the Bradley Gunner Course, the Bradley Commander Course, and the Bradley Master Gunner Course.

Two often-neglected parts of the Preference Statement are the Dependent Data and Remarks blocks. Having current and accurate data on dependents helps the assignment branch at TAPA better consider family needs when determining a soldier's next assignment. And the Remarks block should clearly and concisely state everything that a soldier thinks will affect his availability for the next assignment.

NORTHERN WARFARE SPECIALISTS

Infantry Enlisted Assignments Branch has a continuing need for soldiers who are qualified as Northern Warfare Experts—Special Qualification Identifier (SQI) E—to serve as instructors/evaluators at the Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC), Fort Greely, Alaska.

Anyone who holds SQI E and is interested should submit a DA Form 2635, Enlisted Preference Statement, to Commander, U.S. Army TAPA, ATTN: DAPC-EPK-I, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0452.

ROTC/RC DUTY

The Infantry Assignment Branch at TAPA is screening the files of soldiers who are now or have previously performed duties as platoon sergeants or first sergeants for possible assignment to ROTC or Reserve Component duty.

Because of PCS constraints, we are concentrating on the files of soldiers in MOSs 11B, 11H, and 11C who are overseas and scheduled to return between February and September 1988.

Soldiers in these categories who are interested should contact their career advisors at Infantry Branch.

NCO-ER UPDATE

The noncommissioned officer evaluation reporting (NCO-ER) system, now scheduled for implementation on 1 March 1988, will be implemented sequentially by rank. This sequenced transition from the EER system to the NCO-ER system will accomplish the following objectives:

- Ensure a standardized and equitable transition with all NCOs starting the new system on an equal footing.
- Ensure sufficient time for performance counseling between the rater and the rated NCO before submission of NCO-ERs under the new system.
- Require senior NCOs to be counseled before junior NCOs.
- Distribute the transition workload more evenly.
- Gradually implement the NCO-ER over a longer period of time.

The Active Army transition (which includes AGR NCOs) will be accomplished by rank as depicted in the table. (Implementation instructions for Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve NCOs who are not on active duty will be issued separately by the ARNG and USAR.)

A final EER will be prepared only for NCOs who, as of the "Final Possible EER" date (as shown in the table), have at least 90 rated days since the last EER under the same rater.

NCOs who do not have at least 90 rated days since the last EER under the same rater as of the "Final Possible EER" date will not receive a final EER. The time since the last EER will be considered nonrated but will not be carried forward under the NCO-ER system.

NCOs who are attending resident courses of instruction (scheduled for less than 90 calendar days) on the "Final Possible EER" date will receive a final EER as of the last duty day before departing for the school, if the rated NCO has at least 90 rated days since the last EER under the same rater. The time during the course of instruction before the "NCO-ER From Date" will be considered nonrated but will not be carried forward under the new system. The time during the course of instruction (for these and other NCOs) *on or after* the "NCO-ER From Date" will be considered nonrated but *will* be carried forward under the new system.

NCOs who are promoted to the rank of sergeant with an effective date of promotion on or between 1 June 1988 and 31 August 1988 will not receive a final EER. The time between their promotion and 31 August 1988 will be considered nonrated and will not be carried forward under the new system.

DA Form 2166-6, serving as a final EER, will have the code 9 "final" entered in Part I (Block H).

The time required for "final" EERs to reach USAEREC has been extended from 60 to 90 days.

All NCOs will begin a new rating period under the NCO-ER system beginning with the "NCO-ER From Date." Nonrated time from preceding rating periods under the EER system will not be carried forward under the NCO-ER system.

NCO-ERs will be prepared as events that require a report occur on or after the "First Possible NCO-ER" date (change of rater or annual, for example).

The only NCO-ERs to be prepared between the "Final Possible EER" date and the "First Possible NCO-ER" date will be "relief-for-cause" (new code 5) reports.

All NCOs except corporals will receive their initial performance counseling during the two-month period beginning with the "NCO-ER From Date" for their rank. Corporals will receive their initial counseling beginning 1 December 1988.

Various information concerning the NCO-ER now being released to the field includes a counseling checklist, the NCO-ER form (DA Form 2166-7, and DA Pamphlet 623-205 ("How to").

The point of contact for further information is Major Wise or Sergeant Major Goode, The Army Personnel Administration Center, ATTN: DAPC-MSE, AUTOVON 221-9659/9660.

NCO-ER TRANSITION TABLE

RATED NCO RANK	FINAL POSSIBLE EER	INITIAL PERFORMANCE COUNSELING	NCO-ER FROM DATE	FIRST POSSIBLE NCO-ER
CSM/SGM/1SG/MSG & PSG/SFC on MSG list as of 29 Feb 88	29 Feb 88	Mar/Apr	1 Mar 88	1 Jun 88
PSG/SFC/SSG & SGT on a SSG list as of 31 May 88	31 May 88	Jun/Jul	1 Jun 88	1 Sep 88
SGT not on SSG list as of 31 May 88	31 Aug 88	Sep/Oct	1 Sep 88	1 Dec 88
CPL*	N/A	Dec	N/A	N/A

*Note: Corporals will be counseled but will not receive NCO-ERs.



BOOK REVIEWS

We start the new year by offering you our thoughts about a number of books you might find both interesting and informative. Publishing houses have been most kind in responding to our requests for review copies, and we thank them for their cooperation. Here are just a few of the books we have received in recent months:

• MONTY: FINAL YEARS OF THE FIELD-MARSHAL, 1944-1976. By Nigel Hamilton (McGraw-Hill, 1987. 996 Pages. $29.95). Once again, as he did in the first two volumes of his three-volume biography of Bernard Law Montgomery, the author skews history in a valiant effort to raise his subject's status from that of mere mortal to God-Above-All. Along the way, he savagely pillories almost every senior U.S. military commander in the European theater and dishes out almost equal scorn to many British political and military leaders of the time, (including Winston Churchill).

And all of this is done on behalf of a military commander whose claim to greatness rests on his success in only one battle—Alamein. From that time in October 1942 to the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, Montgomery's actual military record in no way matches the record that he presented to the world in his later writings or that Nigel Hamilton presents in this biography.

Montgomery's conduct of his part of the Allied campaign in Sicily in mid-1943, for example, left much to be desired; his actions in Italy during the last four months of 1943 were even less memorable. The campaign in Normandy in mid-1944 *did not* go according to Montgomery's plan, and his inept handling of the 1st Canadian Army after the breakout, his failure to open the port of Antwerp, and his poorly conceived MARKET-GARDEN operation were not the hallmarks of military greatness. (Hamilton does not devote much space to the last three.)

From 1 September 1944, when he reverted to army group commander from his former exalted position as Allied ground force commander in northwest Europe, Montgomery ceased to be a team player and for the rest of the war did everything he could to undermine General Dwight Eisenhower's position as supreme Allied commander and to regain the power he had lost.

After the war, Montgomery proved a complete failure as head of the post-war British Army, and was saved from oblivion by the creation of a military element in the Western Union, the forerunner of NATO. Then, in 1951, Montgomery refused Churchill's offer to name him supreme commander in Malaya, at the time a key British command. Although he did not hesitate to tell everyone how the situation in Malaya should be handled, Montgomery pleaded to stay in Europe because "I would be no good whatsoever at dealing with scorpions and snakes."

The author's supporting documentation is drawn largely from Montgomery's own writings, all of which are treated as being the unvarnished truth. All other writings, such as Eisenhower's and Bradley's, he considers less than truthful.

Today's U.S. infantryman is warned, therefore, to handle this book with great care. There is one short, seven-page chapter—Chapter Four, Part Five—in which the author lets his guard down and permits a British officer to give a nod to the U.S. effort during the Battle of the Bulge. For these few pages, then, we should be grateful.

• VERY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE, 1941-44. By Alex Danchev (Brassey's-Pergamon, 1987. 201 Pages. $26.00). There were few, if any, similarities between Bernard Montgomery and John Dill, the subject of this book and the man who headed the British Joint Staff Mission in the United States during World War II and who served concurrently as the senior British member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. Dill served in those positions from January 1942 until his death in Washington in November 1944.

He was highly regarded by the members of the U.S. high command and became a close personal friend of George Marshall. The author says that to the Americans, Dill's "contribution to the combined British-American war effort" was of outstanding importance and "no other individual was more responsible for the achievement of complete co-operation in the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff." So much was he liked in Washington that he was paid a most singular honor on his death—a full-scale military funeral followed by burial in Arlington National Cemetery. (In 1950, an equestrian statue, commissioned by his "American friends and associates," was erected at his grave site.)

This well done book, written by a serving officer of the Royal Army Educational Corps in the British Army, explains why Dill was revered by the Americans—and why he was far less honored in Britain. He writes: "To say that Dill was not without honour, save in his own country, would be something of an exaggeration, but not much of one." Dill's own wartime head of government, Winston Churchill, who had given him so much grief during the early war years, ignored his death and his invaluable contributions to the Allied cause.

This is a fine book about what was, indeed, a very special relationship.

• SOVIET GROUND FORCES: AN OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT, by John Erickson, Lynn Hansen, and William Schneider (Westview, 1986. 267 Pages. $26.00). The three authors

NOTE TO READERS: All of the books mentioned in this review section may be purchased directly from the publisher or from your nearest book dealer. We do not sell books. We will furnish a publisher's address on request.

of this book are eminently qualified to write about the Soviet military establishment. In their book, historian John Erickson traces the evolution of the Soviet ground forces from 1941 to 1985; retired U.S. Army colonel William Schneider tells how the Soviet Army trains for war, how it would actually fight a war, and how it makes use of "norms," which cover all material requirements—financial, supply, exploitation, expenditure—for military personnel, units, and formations in both peace and war; and historian Lynn Hansen analyzes the Soviet Air Force and its special relationship with the combined arms doctrine practiced by all Soviet military forces.

The authors conclude that from the Soviet viewpoint "combined arms is the king of the battlefield" and believe that "the Soviet Union has come closer to creating a combined arms outlook among its forces than any other country." They also note that the Soviets believe strongly in the concept roughly translated as the "daring thrust"—a thrust through weak points in an opposing force's defensive lines to seize "critical nodes that can cause the enemy's rapid collapse."

Although the Soviet ground forces are learning a number of painful lessons in Afghanistan, they remain a most formidable force. This book tells us why this is so and what we can expect of it in the future.

• SOVIET AIRLAND BATTLE TACTICS, by William Baxter (Presidio, 1986. 269 Pages. $18.95). The author is a retired U.S. Army officer who now works as a research analyst in Soviet affairs. While on active duty, he was a Soviet foreign area officer. Not many years ago he published a series of articles in ARMY magazine on Soviet military doctrine, tactics, organization, and technology.

In this book, which nicely complements the one mentioned above, he expands on the thoughts he expressed in his magazine series with the aim of describing "how the Soviet Army thinks about itself, and how it intends to perform on the battlefield." He does not discuss "norms" as such, but in a chapter titled "problem solving in military affairs," he explains the Soviet perception of science and the Soviet use of science to determine the specifics of combat.

The author pulls together a mass of material, organizes it well, and presents it in a most agreeable manner. He believes that "the Soviet Army does many things very well, but some things not so well" and that, overall, it is "a formidable and very professional fighting machine." In that, he agrees with Erickson, Schneider, and Hansen.

• RED GOD OF WAR: SOVIET ARTILLERY AND ROCKET FORCES, by Chris Bellamy (Brassey's, 1986. 247 Pages. $33.75). There seems little question that the Soviet Army has a deep and abiding faith in its artillery arm—formally known as Rocket Forces and Artillery—a faith that has been nurtured for more than 500 years.

In this book, the author (who is a British writer with considerable interest in Russian history, literature, and culture) traces the development of Soviet artillery from its earliest days to the present. Along the way, he uses selected examples from Russian wars to develop what he calls the "tradition of excellence." He also furnishes brief biographical sketches of former artillery commanders who played important roles in the development of the artillery and rocket forces, discusses the newer active systems, and explains how the Soviet Army plans to use its artillery in a future war.

He feels that the Soviets will continue to "place great emphasis on this arm, more so than in the West" although there appears to be a definite lack of cooperation between the artillery force and the other combat arms. Recent Soviet military publications contain numerous references to this problem, caused partly by the artillery's technocratic tradition, and offer solutions to it.

This is an excellent study of the Soviet "god of war." All U.S. infantrymen should become familiar with it.

• SOLDIER-STATESMEN OF THE CONSTITUTION, by Robert K. Wright, Jr., and Morris J. McGregor, Jr. (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. 298 Pages. USGPO S/N 008-029-00153-5. $24.00). This book, written by two of the Center's historians, represents the Center's major contribution to the bicentennial celebration of the Constitution. Twenty-three of the 40 men who signed the Constitution on 17 September 1787 (22 of them as delegates and the 23d as the secretary who authenticated the document) were Revolutionary War veterans. A chapter is devoted to each of the 23, explaining the role each played in the war and in the Constitutional Convention. (Shorter sections are devoted to the other 17 delegate signers.)

The book is divided into six parts—a general narrative survey of the constitutional era; the biographical studies of the 23 veterans; summaries of the careers of the other signers; a selection of documents that outline the formation of the U.S. military establishment; five appendixes; and a section devoted to selected further readings. Numerous color illustrations nicely complement the narrative portions while the book's internal layout is most attractive.

No U.S. infantryman interested in the history of our country should pass this book by; it is an invaluable reference tool.

• JANE'S AFV RECOGNITION HANDBOOK, by Christopher F. Foss (Jane's, 1987. 554 Pages. $18.00, Softbound.) Put together by the editor of the much larger *Jane's Armour and Artillery* yearbook, this publication in its somewhat unusual dimensions—7½" x 5"—has been designed to help a user identify quickly and accurately almost any modern armored fighting vehicle (AFV) in service today anywhere in the world, and to give him certain key information on each of the vehicles. A separate section is used to explain how an individual can develop his AFV recognition skills.

Infantrymen will find this book most useful as a reference tool, because each entry contains a vehicle's full technical specifications, key recognition features, development notes, variants, current status and list of users, manufacturer, and for most of the entries a side-view drawing and three photographs.

• WAR ON FILM, MILITARY HISTORY EDUCATION: VIDEO TAPES, MOTION PICTURES, AND RELATED AUDIOVISUAL AIDS, compiled by Major Frederick A. Eiserman (Historical Bibliography Number 6, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1987. 274 Pages, Softbound.) Here is another excellent ref-

erence tool for the infantryman. Although it was designed to assist instructors within the TRADOC Military History Education Program, it can be equally useful to any student of U.S. military history.

The publication is made up of a listing of selected, unclassified government and commercially produced audiovisual items, all of which have been grouped into 10 broad categories. It concludes with a title index.

The compiler is assigned to the Combat Studies Institute and formerly served as editor of *Army Trainer* magazine.

Here are a number of our longer reviews:

ROOSEVELT, DE GAULLE, AND THE POSTS: FRANCO-AMERICAN WAR RELATIONS VIEWED THROUGH THEIR EFFECTS ON THE FRENCH POSTAL SYSTEM, 1941-1944, by D.M. Giangreco (J.V. Bush, Inc., Box 626, Bonita, CA 92002. 1987. 171 Pages. $9.95, Softbound).

Yes, this book is about stamps, certain kinds of stamps. And yes, this book can be considered good postal history. But more importantly it is about wartime civil affairs activities and the part those activities played in the successful Allied prosecution of World War II in French North Africa and in France itself.

Most frontline infantrymen care little about civil affairs or military government activities. They assume that food, supplies, and mail will be delivered to them on a fairly regular basis and have been known to complain quite loudly when this does not happen. They really don't care about the problems the supporting players may be having dozens or even hundreds of miles to the rear.

Unfortunately, unless the civil affairs people can solve the problems they face, the infantryman will eventually suffer. This book is about one of those problems civil affairs units faced during World War II—the continued operation of the French postal system both in French North Africa and in the occupied areas of France between November 1942 and late October 1944.

The author, who is an editor for the *Military Review* at Fort Leavenworth and a specialist in Allied postal operations in Europe during World War II, explains why solving that problem was so important to the Allied cause—and to France—and how it was accomplished. The accomplishment was made far more difficult than it should have been because of French sensitivities and the machinations of various French political groups.

His book throws new light on some of the problems that can be encountered during the conduct of coalition warfare. For that alone it is worth an infantryman's reading.

THE SOVIET ARMY: 1918 TO THE PRESENT. By Albert and Joan Seaton (New American Library, 1986. 292 Pages. $19.95).

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II. By William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar (Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 263 Pages. $21.95). Both books reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, United States Air Force.

These two books on the history of the Soviet Army since 1918 and Soviet military doctrine and policy since 1945 complement each other nicely in the subject matter they cover and the qualifications of the respective authors.

Albert Seaton is a noted British military historian who has written similar books on the German Army during World War II. In this volume he and his collaborator, Joan Seaton, provide a concise summary of the Soviet Army's development and employment since 1918 with an important first chapter on the Tsarist heritage, which provides an important link between the extensive Russian past and all that has transpired during this century.

The book provides excellent coverage for the general reader, but the more specialized reader will find a lot of already familiar material. An excellent bibliography does point the way for further reading on the subject, and the appendix on current Soviet military hardware can serve as a handy desk reference.

The book by William Lee and Richard Staar fits in well with the Seaton volume. The authors provide a detailed look at the development of the Soviet armed forces after World War II and the corresponding development of nuclear doctrine, strategy, and hardware. They offer several chapters on Soviet defense programs during the past 30 years and the nuclear weapon systems built by the Soviets to achieve their objectives during those years.

Their book is well suited for both general and specialized readers. Unfortunately, it should more correctly have been titled "Nuclear Policy" because there is little discussion of the evolution of conventional doctrine and the renewed emphasis on those forces in current years.

THE GREAT WAR IN AFRICA, 1914-1918. By Byron Farwell (Norton, 1986. 382 Pages. $18.95). Reviewed by Captain Harold E. Raugh, Jr., United States Army.

The image most people have of World War I is of the bloody stalemate in France. Names like Flanders, Vimy, Passchendaele, and the Somme immediately come to mind. Few people, though, have heard of Douala, Longido, Morogoro, or Tabora—all battles fought against the Germans in Africa.

Overshadowed by the war in Europe, the campaigns in Germany's four African colonies—Togoland, the Cameroons, German Southwest Africa, and German East Africa—were considered little more than sideshows. As a result, they are little known and generally neglected by most military historians. They were, however, characterized by mobility, gallantry, and human endurance, and were fought over great differences in terrain and climate.

The well-known historian Byron Farwell has done an excellent job chronicling the four campaigns and placing them within the context of the war as a whole. He has made superb use of official histories as well as personal reminiscences, letters, and journal extracts of participants. The latter not only add local color and realism but also give the perceptions of the soldiers who lived, fought, and died in the disease-ridden, humid, and hot jungles.

Farwell's narrative is highly readable and its continuity is outstanding. He covers all aspects of the campaigns—ground, naval, and air—in rich detail.

The unparalleled saga of the German Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck and his *Schutztruppe* is a story of indefatigable and imaginative leadership, indomitable morale and courage, and superhuman endurance. Indeed, his was the only German force during the entire war that was never soundly defeated, and it surrendered only after learning that the Armistice had been signed.

There are more than 30 interesting photographs in the book and four maps that enable a reader to easily follow the progress of the campaigns. Apparently oriented toward the general reader, the book has only an eight-page "select bibliography." A reader who wants to know more about the specific sources of the illuminating quotes and other details will be disappointed by the lack of footnotes.

There are a number of spelling errors in the book, although these do not detract from its readability and effectiveness. Overall, this well written and readable book ably fills a conspicuous void in the literature of World War I. It is well worth the price and cannot be recommended too highly.

THE HISTORY OF THE GERMAN ARMY. By Keith Simpson (Bison Books, 1987. 314 Pages. $18.95). Reviewed by Major Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr., United States Army.

This is a most interesting and well-researched book. It should probably be called "The History of the German Armies" because, as the author explains, the German military heritage is long but largely fragmented. The different German state armies are shown to be as diverse as the history of Germany itself.

Keith Simpson does an excellent job of describing how the stereotyped German soldier has evolved, and he includes many interesting facts about the equipping and training of the German soldiers themselves. His book is not encumbered by a mass of political-military details, but it does stress the major points of relationship between the two. He gives an excellent balance to his treatment of the German armies in different major eras and, unlike many contemporary publications, reminds his readers that a German Army did exist before the Third Reich.

Although this book is not meant to be a complete reference, it does provide an excellent history of the German military heritage.

THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1987-1988. By the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London, 1987. 240 Pages. $27.00, Softbound).

As usual, this world-renowned and authoritative publication provides a comprehensive look at the world's military forces and the defense expenditures of more than 140 countries. This new edition, however, incorporates a number of new features—a loose insert map that shows, on one side, short-range nuclear missile and theater strike aircraft coverage of European territory, and on its other side, NATO and Warsaw Pact command and control structures. Too, the table that has been used each year to compare NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional force levels has been revised to take a broader geographic approach to include forces in areas that may be considered in future arms control talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Once again, military hostilities are discussed on an area-by-area basis, and the Institute does not expect that any of the hostilities will end in the near future. It does, though, have some hope that the Arias Plan may bring about some reconciliation and democratization in the Central American region.

As we have said in years past, there is no better work of its kind on the market today.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR: RIVERINE FORCE. By John Forbes and Robert Williams. Bantam Books, 1987. 158 Pages. $6.95, Softbound.

A COLLECTOR'S GUIDE TO THIRD REICH MILITARIA. By Robin Lumsden. Hippocrene Books, 1987. 192 Pages. $14.95, Softbound.

BATTLEFIELD ARCHAEOLOGY. By John Laffin. Hippocrene Books, 1988. 128 Pages. $22.50.

HEADHUNTERS: STORIES FROM THE 1st SQUADRON, 9th CAVALRY, IN VIETNAM, 1965-1971. Edited by Matthew Brennan. Presidio, 1987. 306 Pages. $18.95.

SURVIVAL ON THE BATTLEFIELD: A HANDBOOK TO MILITARY MARTIAL ARTS. By Robert K. Spear. Unique Publications (4201 Vanowen Place, Burbank, CA 91505), 1987. 185 Pages. $10.95, Softbound.

THE DIVIDED UNION: THE STORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN WAR, 1861-1865. By Peter Batty and Peter Parrish. Salem House, 1987. 224 Pages. $24.95.

FIGHTING TROOPS OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY, 1868-1914. By James Lucas. Hippocrene Books, 1988. 288 Pages. $50.00.

WESTERN EUROPE IN SOVIET GLOBAL STRATEGY. Edited by Ray S. Cline, James A. Miller, and Roger E. Kanet. Westview Press, 1987. 166 Pages. $16.95, Softbound.

AH-1. By Doug Richardson. Modern Fighting Aircraft, Volume 13. Arco, 1987. 64 Pages. $12.95.

AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TANK BUSTERS. By Mike Spick and Bruce Quarry. Arco, 1987. 153 Pages. $10.95.

AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO MODERN FIGHTERS AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT. By Bill Gunston. Arco, 1987. 151 Pages. $10.95.

THE U.S. MARINE CORPS STORY. Revised and Updated by J. Robert Moskin. McGraw-Hill, 1987. 849 Pages. $14.95, Softbound.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT—A RESOURCE GUIDE. Prepared by Lieutenant Colonel David R. Kiernan, Chief of Public Affairs, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg. Softbound, 44 Pages. Free on request to author.

THE ROAD TO TRINITY: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF HOW AMERICA'S NUCLEAR POLICIES WERE MADE. By Major General K.D. Nichols, United States Army Retired. William Morrow, 1987. 401 Pages. $19.95.

BLACK SAILORS: AFRO-AMERICAN MERCHANT SEAMEN AND WHALEMEN PRIOR TO THE CIVIL WAR. By Martha S. Putney. Greenwood Press, 1987. 173 Pages. $29.95.

MEMORIES. By Master Sergeant David H. Puckett, United States Army Retired. Vantage Press, 1987. 145 Pages. $10.95.

LONG-RANGE PATROL OPERATIONS: RECONNAISSANCE, COMBAT, AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS. By Master Sergeant James W. England, United States Army Retired. Paladin Press, 1987. 336 Pages. $14.95, Softbound.

SPECIAL FORCES FOREIGN WEAPONS HANDBOOK. By Sergeant Major Frank A. Moyer. Citadel Press, 1987. 326 Pages. $14.95, Softbound.

ASSAULT PISTOLS, RIFLES, AND SUBMACHINE GUNS. By Duncan Long. Citadel Press, 1987. 142 Pages. $12.95, Softbound.

COMBAT AMMUNITION: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW. By Duncan Long. Citadel Press, 1987. 127 Pages. $12.95, Softbound.

THE ANATOMY OF COURAGE. By Lord Moran. A Reprint in the Publisher's *Art of Command Series*. First published in 1945. Avery Publishing Group, 1987. 224 Pages. $9.95, Softbound.

★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1988/531-638

From The Editor

INFANTRY SCHOOL DIRECTORY

From to time, people in the field have questions they would like to ask the various departments and divisions of the Infantry School. The following directory is offered as an aid in getting quick answers to those questions. All telephone numbers are AUTOVON.

In addition to these points of contact, the Infantry School maintains a hotline specifically to receive questions and comments from the field. The number is AUTOVON 835-7693; commercial (404) 545-7693. Questions received are recorded and answers are returned within 48 hours. Lengthy questions or comments should be sent in writing to Commandant, USAIS, ATTN: ATSH-SE, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5452.

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Director, LTC Walter S. Hair	835-1561
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Commander, COL James E. Mace	784-7305
4th Ranger Training Battalion (Benning Phase)	784-6515
5th Ranger Training Battalion (Mountain Phase)	797-5770
6th Ranger Training Battalion (Florida Phase)	872-8435
Task Force Desert (Desert Phase)—Ft. Benning	784-6421
—Dugway, Utah	789-2415
29th Infantry Regiment	
Commander, COL John D. Fuller	784-6008
Bradley IFV New Equipment Training Team	784-6907
Maintenance Management Division	784-7214
1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment	784-4060
Co A (OSUT BIFV Training)	784-7422
Co B (Mortar Committee)	784-1450
Co C (OSUT M113 Training)	784-1203
Co D (BIFV Committee)	784-2584
Bradley Instructor Detachment	784-6433
2d Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment	784-6819
Co A (Land Navigation Committee)	784-6157
Co B (Antiarmor Committee)	784-6546
Co C (Small Arms Committee)	784-6559
Co D (Tactics/Sniper Training)	784-6985
The School Brigade	
Commander, COL Kenneth L. Teel	835-4301
1st Battalion, 11th Infantry (IOAC)	835-7921
2d Battalion, 11th Infantry (IOBC)	835-1666
3d Battalion, 11th Infantry (OCS)	835-4711
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NCO Academy	
Commandant, CSM James W. Fowler	835-4816

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